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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters each examining different areas of state policy.
Each chapter revolves around an examination of different approaches taken by states in a
particular area of policy. The questions answered arise in the contexts of income taxation,
environmental regulation, and social insurance. Chapter 1 looks at impacts of a particular
policy in one state by comparing that state to select other states. Chapter 2 looks at factors
influencing the adoption of a policy by a group of states, and aspects of implementation.
Chapter 3 looks at the relationship between variations in a policy applied in all states and
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Chapter 1
The Kansas Tax Experiment: Impact of 2012 Kansas Tax Reform on Output,
Employment & Establishments
1.1 Introduction
In 2012, Kansas enacted major tax reform, with primary goals of promoting economic
growth and job creation. The Governor described the reform as a “real live experiment”
and predicted it would be “like a shot of adrenaline into the heart of the Kansas econ-
omy” (MSNBC 2012). Job creation was a major theme in promoting the new tax package,
with emphasis placed on small and new businesses. At the signing ceremony, the Governor
announced: “Today’s legislation will create tens of thousands of new jobs and help make
Kansas the best place in America to start and grow a small business.” A state representa-
tive proclaimed: “Kansas is embarking on and setting the threshold for the nation with a
pro-growth, pro-jobs tax reform policy. Lowering taxes on individuals and small businesses
will jump start the private sector growth in Kansas, allowing Kansans to grow Kansas.” A
media release provided that: “Dynamic projections show the new law will result in 22,900
new jobs, give $2 billion more in disposable income to Kansans and increase population by
35,740, all in addition to the normal growth of the state” (Kansas Office of the Governor
2012).1
Major facets of the reform were decreasing the individual income tax rates (from 3.5 to
3 percent, and from 6.25 and 6.45 to 4.9 percent), and a ‘business income exclusion,’ which
1 The time frame for those projections was not provided in the release, but appears to have
been by 2020.
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essentially excluded self-employment, pass-through business, rental real estate, royalty, and
farming incomes from the state income tax.2 These changes took effect at the start of 2013.
Corporate income taxes did not change, although corporate rates were cut in prior years.
The legislation included limited revenue increasing measures. Additional base-broadening
measures originally proposed were cut from the legislation prior to enactment. Surplus funds
were initially available and new revenue was expected from casinos. But there was no clear
plan to offset the decline in revenue expected to accompany the tax cuts. This has been
a major criticism of the policy. Because Kansas has a constitutional mandate requiring a
balanced budget, it also ensured that future changes (on the spending side, the revenue side,
or on both sides) would be necessary.3
Initial estimates from the Kansas Legislative Research Department of the reforms ex-
pected impact on State General Fund receipts were that it would result in a net lost tax rev-
enue of $231.2 million for fiscal year 2013 (only partially overlapping policy effective dates),
$802.8 million for fiscal year 2014, and greater in each of the next four fiscal years. The
six-year total estimated net lost revenue was $4,539.1 million (Kansas Legislative Research
Department 2012). Figure 1.1 plots annual state-level individual income tax collections in
Kansas from 1994 to 2015. For comparison, averages from two groups of regional states, and
from all U.S. states are also plotted.4 Following the reform, individual income tax collections
in Kansas sharply decline, while comparison group means continue to rise. Total tax revenue
2 More precisely, it fully excluded from the state income tax all income reported on lines 12, 17,
and 18 of a taxpayers’ federal return form (1040).
3 Theoretically, a tax cut could “pay for itself” if it results in increased economic activity and
taxes imposed on that increased activity exceed declines from the cut. However, based on the
legislative record and official statements relating to the policy changes, it does not appear that this
type of effect was envisioned. The initial inclusion of base broadening provisions further signals an
understanding that the enacted provisions were not going to finance themselves. And the projected
economic benefits (in terms of job and population growth), even under favorable estimates, would
not bring revenue gains in excess of the losses.
4 The regional groups are: (1) the four states that border Kansas: Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska,
and Oklahoma, and (2) a slightly modified version of those states, replacing Colorado with Iowa,
which is believed to be more similar to Kansas.
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also initially declines, although not as sharply. From 2012 to 2013, individual income tax
revenue declined 19.4 percent while total tax revenue declined 4.5 percent.
Previous work examining impacts of the same tax legislation focuses on the the business
income exclusion (DeBacker et al. 2016; Turner and Blagg 2017). This paper adds to their
findings by examining additional outcomes and by considering the effects of the entire policy,
which, in addition to the business income exclusion, included a substantial drop in the top
marginal individual income rate. It uses the synthetic control method (SCM) to analyze
the impact on real gross state product (RGSP) per capita, employment, and the number of
business establishments. Results suggest that the tax cuts did not have the desired impact
on most of the outcomes examined.
Section 2 of this paper briefly discusses select related literature. Section 3 provides
additional background surrounding the policy changes of interest. Section 4 describes the
empirical framework used in evaluating the policy changes. Section 5 describes the data and
samples. The remaining sections present empirical results and conclusions.
1.2 Literature Review
As mentioned, the two major components of the 2012 Kansas tax reform were: (1)
the decrease in individual income rates, and (2) the business income exclusion. Both are
components of the individual income tax system, but theoretically apply to different types of
activity. This section discusses select literature on impacts of individual and business income
taxes on economic outcomes, focusing primarily on state-level taxes. It then discusses two
other papers that look at impacts of the 2012 Kansas tax reform.
Empirical evidence on the efficacy of tax cuts as a policy tool for job creation is mixed.
Theoretically, the impact is ambiguous. In the context of state corporate income taxes,
Ljungvist and Smolyansky (2014) find evidence of asymmetric results. In particular, they
find that a one percentage point increase in the top marginal state corporate income tax
3
rate reduced employment by 0.3 to 0.5 percent (and income by between 0.3 and 0.6 per-
cent), measured relative to neighboring counties on the other side of the state border. Rate
decreases, on the other hand, only significantly impacted employment and income during
recessions.
Shuai and Chmura (2013) find evidence that state corporate income tax rate changes
produce short run, transitory impacts. They find significant impacts on state employment
growth, observed primarily in the first year. Results indicate that the act of cutting alone
(measured by a binary indicator) has a significant positive impact in the year of the cut, an
insignificant positive effect the year after, and basically no impact in subsequent years.
At the federal level, Mertens and Ravn (2013) find evidence that corporate income tax
rates impact GDP and investment but not employment or consumption. Specifically, they
find that a one percentage point cut in average federal corporate income tax rates (measured
as the ratio of aggregate federal corporate profit tax receipts to aggregate corporate profits)
increased GDP by 0.4 to 0.6 percent in the short-run, but had no immediate impact on
employment or hours worked. Cuts increased private sector investment but had no impact
consumption.
The two other studies analyzing the Kansas reform have focused on the business exclusion.
DeBacker et al. (2016, 2017) analyze amounts reported in different categories on individual
federal income tax returns. They are able to identify and find evidence of income shifting
separate from real impacts. Turner and Blagg (2017) measure impacts on aggregate mea-
sures of employment and proprietors, but focus more narrowly on the base change impacts;
namely on the business income exclusion.5 They consider two outcomes (employment and
proprietors) each measured three different ways (log, per capita, and growth rate), using two
samples (all counties in the four border states and border county pairs along the Kansas
border) and two pre-intervention periods (one beginning in 2004, the other in 2010). For
5 They focus on base changes by controlling for the rate changes.
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all counties, starting in 2004, they find statistically significant negative impacts on log and
per capita employment. Starting in 2010, estimated impacts for both remain negative but
are not statistically significant. Estimated employment growth impacts are positive but not
statistically significant. Their estimated level impacts for proprietors are all negative and
not statistically significant.
1.3 Policy Change Details and Background
The 2012 tax legislation (HB 2117) was enacted in May of 2012, and became effective
July 2012. Most (if not all) of the tax provisions were written to apply beginning in the
2013 tax year. Tax reform was identified as part of the political agenda at least as early
as January 2011.6 The 2012 legislation was followed with additional tax legislation in 2013,
2014, 2015, and 2017.
The reform decreased individual income tax rates for all taxpayers, collapsed the number
of brackets from three to two, and increased the standard deduction for joint and head of
household filers. For the top bracket, the rate dropped from 6.45 and 6.25 percent to 4.9
percent. For the lower bracket, the rate dropped from 3.5 to 3 percent. The new business
income exclusion subtracted amounts reported on federal 1040 lines 12, 17, and 18 from
income for the purposes of the state income tax. Those lines correspond to business income,
rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, trusts, and farm income. Revenue
increasing measures reduced and eliminated a handful of credits and refunds, and provided
for a gradual reduction (partial phase-out) in itemized deductions for individual taxpayers.
The changes also eliminated a severance tax exemption.
6 For example, the Governors State of the State Address from January 2011 noted a tax policy
agenda. (“And for all of this to work, we need a tax code that encourages investment, income growth,
and job creation. I pledge to work with the Legislature on resetting our tax code, particularly with
an eye toward lowering income tax rates. In general, my Administration’s first priority will be
creating jobs that provide more income and opportunity for Kansas families. ... The days of ever
expanding government are over and under my administration, they will not return.”)
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As mentioned in the introduction, the 2012 reform did not substantively modify the
corporate income tax. As a result, direct labor demand effects from the tax policy changes
should be limited to only noncorporate entities (more precisely, to entities not taxed as
corporate entities, including S-corporations). Noncorporate employment was approximately
38 percent of total employment on average from 2010 to 2012 in Kansas (County Business
Patterns, annual state-wide numbers).
A series of top corporate income rate cuts were phased in from 2008 to 2011. The top
corporate income rate dropped from 7.35 to 7.1 percent for 2008, then to 7.05 percent for
2009 and 2010, and finally to 7 percent for 2011 and beyond. Corporate franchise tax rate
reductions were phased in over the same period, and the applicability threshold was increased.
If those corporate tax changes, taking effect from 2008 to 2011, affected economic activity
(relative to control groups), they will confound difference-in-differences estimates of the 2012
reform’s impact on that activity.
1.4 Empirical Approach
I estimate impacts of the Kansas tax reform on output, employment, and establishments
using the synthetic control method (SCM). The SCM is introduced in Abadie and Gardeaza-
bal (2003), and expanded on by Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010, 2015). In the tax
policy context, it has been used to evaluate impacts of flat tax reforms (Adhikari and Alm
2016). The SCM is particularly well suited for examining impacts of a single policy inter-
vention on aggregate outcome variables. It also removes some of the arbitrariness involved
in selection control units. This section introduces the empirical framework and synthetic
control estimation.
A synthetic control is a weighted average of outcome values from a set of potential control
units. The set of potential control units is referred to in the literature as the “donor pool.”
Using a set of predictor variables, weights are assigned to each state in the donor pool so
6
that the resulting synthetic control matches the treated state as closely as possible during
a pre-intervention period. The following framework described is based on Abadie, Diamond
and Hainmueller (2010).
States s = 1, . . . , S+1, are observed for time periods t = 1, . . . , T . The first state (s = 1)
is Kansas (or more generally the treated state). The S remaining states form the donor
pool. The policy change of interest occurs at time T0 + 1, so that t = 1, . . . , T0 indexes
the pre-intervention period, and t = T0 + 1, . . . , T indexes the post-intervention period. Yst
denotes the outcome of interest for state s at time t. The effect of the policy intervention
for unit s at time t is specified in a potential outcomes framework as αst = Y
T
st − Y 0st, where







1 if s = 1 and t > T0
0 otherwise.
Each state in the donor pool is assigned a non-negative weight ws, such that the combined
weights for all states in the donor pool sum to one. The weights collectively form a (S × 1)
vector W . The weights defining a given synthetic control W ∗ are chosen to minimize:
||X1 −X0W ||V =
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ),
where X1 is a vector of predictor variables for the treated unit, X0 is a matrix containing
the same predictor variables for each of the donor pool units, and V is a symmetric, positive
semidefinite matrix of weights assigned to the predictor variables. The predictor variable
weights are assigned to reflect the relative importance of each predictor variable in predicting
7
the outcome of interest. This can be done in different ways.7 I solve for both the donor pool
and predictor variable weights using the Synth package in R.
Given W ∗ and a matrix Y0 containing the outcome variable values for each donor pool
unit in each time period, the counterfactual outcome path is Y ∗1 = Y0W
∗. The estimated
policy impact is given by the difference between that counterfactual outcome path and the
observed values for the treated unit following the policy intervention. Dynamic treatment
effects for year t ∈ {T0 + 1, · · · , T} are given by:




where, as indicated above, s = 1 is Kansas, s ∈ {2, · · · , S+1} are the donor pool states, and







Outcomes in both the treated state and donor pool states are assumed to follow a linear
factor model:
Y 0st = δt + θtZs + λtµs + εst,
where Y 0st is the outcome absent the intervention, δt are unknown common factors with
constant loadings across states (common time effects), θt is a vector of unknown loadings
(parameter), Zs are observed covariates not affected by the intervention, λt are unobserved
common factors, µs are unknown factor loadings, and εst are unobserved, mean zero, state
7 Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) select predictor variable weights such that the outcome variable
path for the treated unit during the pre-intervention period is best reproduced by the resulting
synthetic control. Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015) apply a cross-validation method to
choose the predictor variable weights.
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level transitory shocks. When λt = 1 and µs = δs, the model simplifies to a two-way fixed
effects model.
Unlike difference-in-difference estimates, synthetic control estimates allow for time vary-
ing heterogeneity in unobserved variables (i.e., do not require the parallel trends assumption).
Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) show this in the context of the above specified
model. When the number of pre-intervention periods is large relative to the size of the error,
the bias from time varying heterogeneity approaches zero. Additional identification assump-
tions include that untreated donor pool states are not affected by the same intervention (no
spillover effects) or by similar interventions, and that the intervention has no effect on the
outcome before being implemented (no anticipation effects).
To minimize the potential for biased estimates, I use a ten year pre-intervention period.
To eliminate anticipation effects, I do not include 2012 in the pre-intervention period when
finding synthetic control weights.8 Because the policy had not yet taken effect, I also do
not include 2012 in calculating treatment effects. At the state-level, spillover effects are not
expected to be substantial. To eliminate states affected by similar interventions from the
donor pool, as described in the next section, I impose a restriction based on top marginal
income tax rate changes.
Not all states will be well matched by synthetic controls. For example, if Kansas had
observed outcome values strictly greater than all donor pool state values, the Kansas values
would not be reproducible as a convex combination of the donor pool values. There is also
a risk of interpolation bias if states in the donor pool are not similar enough to the treated
state (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2010). Graphical results are presented to facilitate
evaluation of the match. Additionally, following Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015),
8 The legislation was enacted by mid 2012. At that point the changes were certain. While it
did not become effective until 2013, people may have started changing their status or behavior in
anticipation of the policy during 2012. For example, employees wanting to change status to an
independent contractor could have done so during the end of 2012, so as to benefit immediately
once 2013 began.
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I compute the root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) over the pre-intervention period










A disadvantage of the synthetic control method is the lack of formalized inference. Placebo
methods are used instead. Placebo tests are run for every state in the donor pool. A syn-
thetic control is constructed for each state yielding a distribution of placebo effects. Donor
pool states, having not been subject to the intervention, should not have large estimated
treatment effects. The distribution of placebo effects is used to calculate empirical p-values
for average and dynamic treatment effects. The formula used is:
p1 =
∑S+1
s=2 {α̂s ≥ α̂1}
S
.
These values indicate the chance of estimating an effect as large as that actually estimated.
The procedure used largely follows Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010), with the
exception that I do not include Kansas (the treated state) in the donor pool for the placebo
synthetic controls.
Placebo estimates that do not fit well in the pre-intervention period are not expected
to fit well in the post-intervention period. Further they are not expected to be informative
of the chance of estimating an effect as large as that estimated for a state with a closer
pre-intervention fit. To adjust for this, thresholds based on pre-intervention can be used
as restrictions. Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) produce multiple sets of placebo
tests using three different cutoffs, excluding states with a pre-intervention MSPE of: (i) more
than 20 times the treated state MSPE, (ii) more than 5 times the treated state MSPE, and
(iii) more than twice the treated state MSPE. An alternative, that avoids choosing a cutoff,
is to look at the ratio of the post to pre intervention MSPE, as is done in Abadie, Diamond
10
and Hainmueller (2015). This is the approach I follow. For each state in the donor pool, I





























Ratio values for each state are used to rank the treated state and calculate an empirical
“p-value.”
Placebo tests cannot rule out the possibility that the estimated impact is driven by an-
other cause. Specifically, they cannot rule out the presence of idiosyncratic shocks or other
policy changes. The placebo method does not reflect this source of uncertainty. While the
SCM is said to be a more “data driven” approach, and in some senses is, it still requires
selecting donor pool members, predictor variables, and the pre-intervention period to use in
optimizing weights. Each of these selections presents an opportunity for difficult and possi-
bly arbitrary decisions that could end up driving analysis results.
Difference-in-differences estimates are based on the following standard model,
Yst = α (KSs × Postt) + us + vt + ϵst,
where α is the policy treatment effect, Yst is the outcome variable, us are state fixed effects
(which absorb state level differences that remain constant over the period examined), and vt
are time fixed effects (which absorb differences over time that effect the states in the same
way). KSs is an indicator equal to one for Kansas. Postt is an indicator equal to one for
observations in 2013 or later. Identifying assumptions include that the treated and control
states follow parallel trends in the outcome variable, no spillover effects, and no anticipation
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effects.
The difference-in-differences analysis uses a control group primarily based on geographic
proximity. Four states border Kansas: Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. I
use Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, in essence replacing Colorado with Iowa.9
Anecdotally, Kansas and Colorado are expected to differ in a number of important respects.
Colorado is a popular tourist destination with winter and summer attractions. Kansas is not.
Additionally, legalization of marijuana for recreational use, a potentially important positive
economic shock, became effective in Colorado at the end of 2013.
1.5 Data
This section introduces the data and samples used in the empirical analysis. Analysis is
done at the state-year level, from 2001 to 2015.
1.5.1 Outcome Measures
Real gross state product (RGSP) is from BEA’s Annual Gross Domestic Product by State
data. Positive impacts from tax cuts could be directly offset in RGSP by accompanying
decreases in government spending. To evaluate this, I adjust RGSP by subtracting off the
public sector component. In Kansas, the pubic sector accounted for approximately 15.1
percent of annual RGSP on average from 2000 to 2011. Results are reported for both the
original and adjusted measures.
Employment is from the BEA State Personal Income accounts. It includes wage and
salary employment, as well as proprietor employment. It also includes farm employment, an
9 Admittedly, this makes the control group selection more ad-hoc than it would be relying solely
on geographic proximity and selecting the bordering states. However, comparing means of each
outcome variable for Kansas, the border state group, and the adjusted version demonstrates that
the adjusted version is more similar to Kansas than the border version.
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important sector in Kansas that is not included in all measures of employment.
Establishment data is from the US Census County Business Patterns (state-level files).
A separate measure of establishments, establishments with no employees is also considered.
Nonemployer establishments data is from the US Census Nonemployer Statistics (NES).
Nonemployers are not counted in either establishments or employment.
1.5.2 Predictor Variables
Predictors variables used in constructing synthetic controls vary some by outcome but
mostly overlap. The specific predictors for each outcome and resulting weights are reported
with results. They include sector shares, demographic, labor market, and human capital
measures, which are related to economic growth and similar to predictor variables included
in other studies (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015).
Sector shares are calculated based on RGSP. Population, gender, age, and population density
data are from the Census. Unemployment rate, labor force participation rate, education, and
workforce skill level data are from individual-level Current Population Survey microdata,
aggregated to the state-year level. Several, but not all, lags of the outcome variables are
included. Alternative approaches are to include the average, or the last observed value.
1.5.3 Donor Pool
The donor pool is selected from the 50 US states. States without individual or corporate
income taxes are excluded, as are states that had, in a single year, corporate or individual
income rate changes at or above a one percentage point threshold.10 Policy thresholds have
10 State data on the top corporate income tax rate, the top individual income tax rate, and the
sales tax rate for 2000 to 2015 are from the Tax Foundation. The rate data is not perfect. For
example, in the case of Kansas it leaves out the decrease in the top corporate income tax rate from
7.35 percent to 7.1 percent taking effect in 2008.
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been used in other contexts to decide which groups to include in a donor pool.11 Louisiana
is also excluded. The top rate in Kansas dropped by 1.55 beginning in 2013, well above the
threshold. By contrast, none in the series of small corporate income rate cuts between 2007
and 2011 exceed this threshold. Nor do any of the small individual rate cuts that took effect
in Kansas after 2013.
From 2001 to 2015, 105 changes in top individual income rates (77 decreases and 28
increases), and 80 changes in top corporate income rates are observed. Decreases were more
frequently observed, but increases were more likely to exceed one percentage point. 15.58
percent of the individual and 25 percent of the corporate rate decreases were one percentage
point or higher.12 39.29 percent of the individual and 60 percent of the corporate rate
increases were one percentage point or higher.13 These exclusions leave a baseline donor pool
of Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and West Virgina. Figure 1.2 shows
Kansas in gray and each of the donor states in blue.
1.5.4 Time Frame
Analysis is done at the state-year level from 2001 to 2015. Following Abadie, Diamond
and Hainmueller (2010) and others, I use ten years of pre-intervention data: from 2001 to
2011. Longer time periods should reduce the potential bias from time-varying unobservable
effects (as described above, this source of bias approaches zero as the pre-intervention period
increases). As explained above, 2012 is not included in the pre-intervention period due to
concern about anticipation effects.14
11 For example, in considering the impact of a large scale Tobacco control program implemented
in California, ADH 2010 used having had a state per pack cigarette tax increase of 50 cents or more
as a threshold for excluding states.
12 Respectively, 12 out of 77 and 15 out of 60.
13 Respectively, 11 out of 28, and 12 out of 20.
14 The reform was fully enacted by the middle of 2012, leaving time for taxpayers to plan for and
potentially change activity in anticipation of the changes taking effect.
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1.6 Empirical Results
This section describes the empirical results. The results for the first outcome, RGSP per
capita, are explained in greater detail than the others. Similar explanations hold for other
outcomes. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 report donor pool and predictor weights for the three baseline
outcomes (real GSP per capita, employment, and establishments). Table 1.3 reports pre-
intervention averages in KS, the donor pool states, and for the weighted synthetic control
for each outcome.
1.6.1 Real Gross State Product Per Capita
Figure 1.3 presents results for RGSP per capita in four graphs. Figure 1.3(a), shows actual
RGSP per capita in Kansas (in blue) and for the estimated synthetic control for Kansas (in
gray). The dashed vertical line (in red) marks the beginning of 2013. The difference between
the synthetic control and Kansas before 2013 indicates how well the synthetic control fits,
with a closer match indicating a better fit. The gap between the synthetic control and Kansas
after 2013 is the estimated policy impact. Figure 1.3(b) plots the gap between Kansas and
the synthetic control. The gap indicates that RGSP per capita decreased following the tax
cuts relative to the synthetic control. However, the timing of the divide between Kansas
and its synthetic raises a question about whether the gap is driven by something other than
the policy intervention. Furthermore, large gaps between Kansas and the synthetic control
prior to the policy changes raise a question about how well the synthetic control fits this
Kansas data. Figure 1.3(c) shows the placebo analysis results. For each state in the donor
pool, the gap between the observed state data its synthetic control is shown in gray. The
gap for Kansas is shown in blue. After the policy change, Kansas lies below all but one other
state. Figure 1.3(d) plots the post to pre RMSPE ratio for Kansas and all other states in the
donor pool. Two states have values greater than Kansas. Table 1.4 reports the estimated
treatment effects, pre and post RMSPE, ratio, and p-value. The average treatment effect is
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approximately negative 2,999 per capita. This is economically substantial - almost $3,000
per person, per year. However, the number is not statistically significant applying the ratio
test of Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015).
Excluding the public sector component of RGSP makes little difference. Figure 1.4
compares the total RGSP (solid lines) and private sector (dashed lines) results. The private
sector results closely mirror overall results. Table 1.4 includes estimates for the private sector
version.
1.6.2 Employment
Graphical results for total employment are presented in Figures 1.6(a) through 1.6(d).
Figure 1.6(a) suggests total employment in Kansas declined following the tax cuts relative to
the synthetic control. The ratio distribution indicates that this result is significant at a ten
percent level. However, again the gap appears to begin before 2013. Figures 1.7(a) and 1.7(b)
show results for the proprietor and the wage and salary components of total employment.
Figure 1.7(b) shows a negative and significant impact on wage and salary employment similar
to that observed for total employment. Figure 1.7(a), however, shows a positive impact on
proprietor employment. The results are summarized in Table 1.5. As a robustness check,
results for a second measure of employment is also included in Table 1.5. The second measure
is from Census County Business Patterns data. It does not include agriculture, government,
or self-employment. Results are similar to those from the primary measure, although are
not significant. The dynamic treatment effects move in different directions as compared to
the primary employment measure. This could reflect heterogeneous impacts in industries
not included in the later measure. Graphical results for the later measure are presented in
Figures 1.8(a) through 1.8(d).
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1.6.3 Establishments
Figures 1.9(a) through 1.9(d) show the synthetic control results for establishments. The
results indicate that the number of establishments declines relative to the synthetic control,
although the gap appears to begin prior to the tax cuts. Based on the ratio distribution, the
result is not significant. Figures 1.10(a) through 1.10(d) show synthetic control results for
nonemployer establishments, which are not included in the establishments measure. Nonem-
ployer establishments are businesses with no payroll and at least $1,000 in annual revenue.
The results indicate a positive but not significant impact on nonemployer establishments
similar to that observed for proprietor employment. Table 1.6 reports estimated treatment
effects, RMSPEs, ratio, and p-values for both establishments and nonemployer establish-
ments.
1.6.4 Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Table 1.7 presents difference-in-difference estimates for real GSP per capita, employment,
and establishments. Results are mostly not significant. Note that while coefficient magni-
tudes are large, standard errors are comparably large.
1.7 Conclusion
Results indicate that the Kansas tax experiment did not have the impact politicians had
hoped for. Overall the results suggest that the reform did not have a positive impact on
state-level economic outcomes. They indicate potentially negative impacts on the three main
outcomes considered. The findings are largely consistent with those in other papers looking
at the same Kansas tax reform (DeBacker et al. 2017; Turner and Blagg 2017). The results
are also consistent with empirical findings that tax cuts are less effective during expansionary
phases of the business cycle (Ljungvist and Smolyansky 2014). They are less consistent with
expectations based on economic theory, which suggests some channels through which a tax
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cut could have negative impacts on economic activity, but more generally associates tax cuts
with positive impacts.
I find evidence of positive impacts on proprietor employment and on nonemployer es-
tablishments. This is consistent with individuals and firms restructuring economic activity,
as suggested in DeBacker et al. (2017). It is also consistent with expansionary activity, in
the form of individuals starting new businesses, and with the policy having had a positive
impact on small businesses.
A limitation of the method used is that it cannot rule out the possibility that other
changes at or around the same time caused the observed differences in outcomes relative
to synthetic controls. Some of the synthetic control graphs suggest that there may have
been an impact from prior to the tax reform taking effect, particularly in 2010 or 2011.
Factors exogenous to tax policy, occurring around the time of or after the reform, could have
influenced the observed results. Around 2013, a large manufacturer in the aviation industry
relocated to another state. The firm had more than 2,000 employees in Kansas when it
announced its relocation (The Wichita Eagle 2014). It is unlikely that the relocation was
related to the tax reform, though it would have directly and indirectly impacted economic
activity in the state around the same time. Exogenous volatility in energy markets and
changes in the agricultural sector could also have impacted results.
Analysis of private sector measures of RGSP and employment suggest that the results
are not directly explained by a corresponding decline in government spending. However,
indirect effects of decreasing government spending could have influenced results. Subsequent
tax changes, such as the state sales tax increase, could also have influenced results.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1: Individual Income Tax Revenue, Annual State Average (millions/year)
Dashed vertical line marks the beginning of 2013 (policy effective date). Source: U.S. Census
Bureau and author calculation. Shaded areas reflect NBER recession dates.
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Figure 1.2: Map of Donor Pool States
Gray = Kansas. Blue = donor pool states.
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Table 1.1: Synthetic Control Weights
State RGSP Emp Estab
Arkansas 0 0 .001
Colorado 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0
Idaho 0 .001 .062
Iowa 0 .005 .329
Massachusetts 0 .214 .252
Maine .197 .190 .142
Mississippi 0 .001 .001
Missouri 0 0 .001
Nebraska .103 .457 .138
Oklahoma .700 .132 .003
Pennsylvania 0 0 .001
South Carolina 0 0 .001
West Virgina 0 0 .069
See text for additional details.
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Table 1.2: Synthetic Control Predictor Weights
(a) Real GSP Per Capita (c) Establishments
Sector share 6 .209 Sector share 7 .245
Sector share 2 .159 Establishments, 2001 .207
Prime age male .130 Middle skill workforce .166
Bachelors or higher .127 Prime age male .136
RGSP per capita, 2003 .112 Sector share 1 .064
Population growth .111 Employee compensation per capita .064
RGSP per capita, 2008 .084 Establishments, 2009 .053
RGSP per capita, 2007 .023 Establishments, 2005 .030
Labor force participation rate .013 Population density .022
RGSP per capita, 2001 .013 Establishments, 2008 .013
Sector share 7 .007 High school or lower education 0
High school or lower education .004 Bachelors or higher 0
Sales tax rate .002 Labor force participation rate 0
Middle skill workforce .002 Population growth 0
RGSP per capita, 2006 .002 Sector share 2 0
RGSP per capita, 2002 .001 Sector share 9 0
Population density 0
Unemployment rate 0
Sector share 1 0
Sector share 3 0
Sector share 4 0
Sector share 5 0
(b) Employment
Bachelors or higher .209
Employee compensation per capita .190
Middle skill workforce .182





Sector share 2 .038
Prime age male .034
Employment, 2008 .015
Labor force participation rate .001
Population growth .001
Employment, 2009 .001
Sector share 7 0
Sector share 9 0
High school or lower education 0
Baseline analysis variable weights. See text for additional detail.
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Table 1.3: Predictor Variable Average Values
Avg KS SCRGSP SCEmp SCEstab
Pop Growth 0.806 0.573 0.717 0.556 0.499
Population density 0.019 0.03 0.018 0.028 0.023
Prime Male 20.544 20.32 20.41 20.545 20.426
Sector 1 4.16 3.96 8.74 4.29 3.83
Sector 2 5.12 4.32 4.41 4.73 4.83
Sector 3 13.10 15.91 10.96 - -
Sector 4 18.31 19.30 17.11 - -
Sector 5 3.77 5.22 3.24 - -
Sector 6 16.88 14.62 15.81 - -
Sector 7 9.80 8.55 9.78 10.62 8.75
Sector 9 3.66 3.05 - 3.38 3.43
High School/Lower 47.9 39.8 46.0 43.9 45.9
Bachelor/Higher 26.0 31.1 27.4 29.1 27.2
Middle Skill 45.1 43.7 44.4 43.7 44.3
Unemp Rate 6.0 5.6 5.1 - -
LFPR 65.1 69.4 64.6 68.4 67.7
Empee Comp 21,470 22,732 - 24,019 22,629
Sales Rate 5.166 5.282 4.755 - -
RGSP 2001 39,334 39,745 39,823 - -
RGSP 2002 39,630 40,169 40,009 - -
RGSP 2003 40,442 40,945 40,782 - -
RGSP 2006 42,377 43,593 44,186 - -
RGSP 2007 42,709 45,314 44,705 - -
RGSP 2008 42,544 46,050 44,920 - -
Emp 2001 2,498,662 1,767,584 - 1,760,015 -
Emp 2005 2,573,656 1,767,517 - 1,778,566 -
Emp 2008 2,684,307 1,861,559 - 1,851,232 -
Emp 2009 2,612,590 1,818,445 - 1,815,967 -
Emp 2011 2,636,823 1,820,268 - 1,829,061 -
Estab 2001 107,874 74,565 - - 74,530
Estab 2005 113,044 76,173 - - 76,017
Estab 2008 114,423 76,096 - - 76,135
Estab 2009 111,951 74,698 - - 74,596
Avg = donor pool mean. SC values are weighted averages using donor pool weights.
Weights are different for each outcome. See text for additional detail.
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Figure 1.3: SCM Results for Real Gross State Product Per Capita
(a) Actual and Synthetic KS (b) Gap: Actual – Synthetic
(c) Placebo Gap Distribution (d) Post-to-Pre RMSPE Ratio
Dashed red vertical line marks the beginning of 2013 (policy effective date).
(a) Blue = Kansas data. Gray = synthetic control.
(c) Blue = gap between actual and synthetic for Kansas. Gray lines = gap between observed data
and placebo synthetic control for each donor pool state.
(d) Post-intervention RMSPE calculated for 2013 to 2015. Pre-intervention RMSPE is calculated
for 2001 to 2011.
Source: Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State, BEA and author calculation.
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Figure 1.4: SCM Results for Private and Public Components of RGSP
Solid = total RGSP per capita. Dashed = private sector component.
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Figure 1.5: SCM Results for Private Sector RGSP Per Capita
(a) Actual and Synthetic KS (b) Gap: Actual – Synthetic
(c) Placebo Gap Distribution (d) Post-to-Pre RMSPE Ratio
Dashed red vertical line marks the beginning of 2013 (policy effective date).
(a) Blue = Kansas data. Gray = synthetic control.
(c) Blue = gap between actual and synthetic for Kansas. Gray lines = gap between observed data
and placebo synthetic control for each donor pool state.
(d) Post-intervention RMSPE calculated for 2013 to 2015. Pre-intervention RMSPE is calculated
for 2001 to 2011.
Source: Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State, BEA and author calculation.
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Table 1.4: RGSP Synthetic Control Results
RGSP Priv RGSP









Empirical RMSPE Ratio P-value .2 .2
See text for additional detail.
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Figure 1.6: SCM Results for Total Employment
(a) Actual and Synthetic KS (b) Gap: Actual – Synthetic
(c) Placebo Gap Distribution (d) Post-to-Pre RMSPE Ratio
Dashed red vertical line marks the beginning of 2013 (policy effective date).
(a) Blue = Kansas data. Gray = synthetic control.
(c) Blue = gap between actual and synthetic for Kansas. Gray lines = gap between observed data
and placebo synthetic control for each donor pool state.
(d) Post-intervention RMSPE calculated for 2013 to 2015. Pre-intervention RMSPE is calculated
for 2001 to 2011.
Source: BEA and author calculation.
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Figure 1.7: SCM Results for Components of Employment
(a) Proprietor Employment (b) Wage & Salary Employment
Dashed red vertical line marks the beginning of 2013 (policy effective date). (1) actual and synthetic
comparison (blue = Kansas, gray = synthetic Kansas), (2) actual and synthetic gap, and (3) placebo
analysis RMSPE ratio distribution. Source: BEA and author calculation.
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Table 1.5: Employment Synthetic Control Results
Total Proprietor Wage & Salary CBP
Average Treatment Effect -35,279 5,191 -38,314 -29,429
Dynamic Treatment Effect
2013 -22,013 7,820 -28,094 -25,483
2014 -25,649 6,198 -34,186 -23,453
2015 -58,174 1,554 -52,662 -39,349
RMSPE
Pre 7,034 1,635 5,526 8,289
Post 38,844 5,831 39,713 30,264
Ratio 5.52 3.57 7.19 3.65
Empirical RMSPE Ratio P-value .067 .333 .133 .133
See text for additional detail.
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Figure 1.8: SCM Results for CBP Employment
(a) Actual and Synthetic KS (b) Gap: Actual – Synthetic
(c) Placebo Gap Distribution (d) Post-to-Pre RMSPE Ratio
Dashed red vertical line marks the beginning of 2013 (policy effective date).
(a) Blue = Kansas data. Gray = synthetic control.
(c) Blue = gap between actual and synthetic for Kansas. Gray lines = gap between observed data
and placebo synthetic control for each donor pool state.
(d) Post-intervention RMSPE calculated for 2013 to 2015. Pre-intervention RMSPE is calculated
for 2001 to 2011.
Sources: County Business Patterns, U.S. Census.
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Figure 1.9: SCM Results for Statewide Establishments
(a) Actual and Synthetic KS (b) Gap: Actual – Synthetic
(c) Placebo Gap Distribution (d) Post-to-Pre RMSPE Ratio
Dashed red vertical line marks the beginning of 2013 (policy effective date).
(a) Blue = Kansas data. Gray = synthetic control.
(c) Blue = gap between actual and synthetic for Kansas. Gray lines = gap between observed data
and placebo synthetic control for each donor pool state.
(d) Post-intervention RMSPE calculated for 2013 to 2015. Pre-intervention RMSPE is calculated
for 2001 to 2011.
Source: County Business Patterns, U.S. Census and author calculation.
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Figure 1.10: SCM Results for Nonemployer Establishments
(a) Actual and Synthetic KS (b) Gap: Actual – Synthetic
(c) Placebo Gap Distribution (d) Post-to-Pre RMSPE Ratio
Dashed red vertical line marks the beginning of 2013 (policy effective date).
(a) Blue = Kansas data. Gray = synthetic control.
(c) Blue = gap between actual and synthetic for Kansas. Gray lines = gap between observed data
and an estimated placebo synthetic control for each state in the donor pool.
(d) Post-intervention RMSPE calculated for 2013 to 2015. Pre-intervention RMSPE is calculated
for 2001 to 2011.
Source: Nonemployer Statistics, U.S. Census.
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Table 1.6: Establishments Synthetic Control Results
Establishments Nonemployer Estabs









Empirical RMSPE Ratio P-value .067 .133
See text for additional detail.
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Table 1.7: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
RGSP Emp Est
KS × Post -1,216.2 -13,513.38 -3,120.35∗∗∗
(1,169.13) (20,337.59) (885.90)
KS × 2013 -962.85 -11,779.79 -2,149.94∗∗∗
(955.95) (22,131.35) (725.32)
KS × 2014 -1,535.58 -7,626.54 -3,075.69∗∗∗
(1,306.14) (22,230.95) (921.04)
KS × 2015 -1,150.25 -21,133.79 -4,135.44∗∗∗
(1,307.21) (19,149.29) (1,497.51)
Observations 75 75 75
Average:
R2 0.0218 0.0061 0.1046
Adjusted R2 -0.3161 -0.3373 -0.2047
F Statistic 1.227 0.3369 6.424∗∗
Dynamic:
R2 0.0229 0.0074 0.1134
Adjusted R2 -0.3643 -0.3859 -0.2379
F Statistic 0.4135 0.132 2.2601∗
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Estimated
with state and year fixed effects. Estimated for 2001 to 2015,
including state-level observations for IA, KS, MO, NE, OK.
Dynamic and average effects estimated separately.
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Chapter 2
State Adoption and Implementation of Numeric Nutrient Criteria
2.1 Introduction
The concentration of nutrients (particularly nitrogen and phosphorus) in surface waters
currently pose substantial threats to water quality in the United States. These threats have
important human health, animal health, and economic consequences. Nutrients in water lead
to photosynthesis which leads to plant growth, and particularly to algae growth. Nutrient
levels in excess of what the ecosystem can naturally handle cause problematic, excessive
plant growth. Plants take oxygen from the water, killing fish, and can make water treatment
more cumbersome and expensive. Excessive nutrients can also lead to toxic algae that make
human and animal contact with affected water unsafe, and potentially deadly. In recent
years, the presence of such toxins has caused beaches to shut down and resulted in water
being declared undrinkable. Nutrient over-enrichment is widely accepted as the cause of the
hypoxic (‘dead’) zone in the Gulf of Mexico.
Nutrients are naturally occurring and necessary. Problematic, excessive nutrient pres-
ence and its results are described by the phrases ‘cultural eutrophication,’ ‘nutrient over-
enrichment,’ and ‘nutrient pollution.’ These phrases are viewed and used here interchange-
ably. Generally the distinction between nutrient presence of concern and that not of concern
lies in connection to human activity. Naturally occurring levels of nutrients are not the
concern of policy efforts. Nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) are the nutrients primarily
viewed as responsible for nutrient pollution. Both enter surface waters from a similar set of
sources: municipal and industrial wastewater discharges, agricultural and urban runoff, and
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atmospheric deposition and automobile exhaust (EPA 1988a; EPA 1994a). Select domestic
products, such as detergents, also tend to contain phosphates (EPA 1988b). In some settings
only one of the two, N or P, will be the “limiting nutrient,” meaning that the non-limiting
nutrient is not thought to contribute excessive plant growth. In most freshwater ecosystems,
P is the limiting nutrient with respect to plant growth and eutrophication, but in some cases
N can be (EPA 1994a).
Nutrient pollution has been a recognized problem in the US since at least as early as the
nineteen-sixties.1 In the nineties the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began a new
campaign to address the problem. Nationally, under the Clean Water Act (CWA), the EPA
is charged with maintaining the nation’s water quality. Nutrient pollution falls within that
scope. Under the CWA framework, both the EPA and the states play roles in establishing,
implementing, and enforcing regulatory policies. In the case of nutrient pollution, EPA
developed Guidelines for the states to use in establishing their own nutrient policies. A major
aspect of the Guidelines was development of numeric nutrient criteria (NNCs). NNCs would
impose quantitative restrictions on nutrient-related parameters. Quantitative restrictions
were thought to be easier to implement.
EPA Guidelines for water quality standards are theoretically mandatory instructions to
the states. If a state fails to adopt a criterion as recommended by EPA Guidelines, or fails to
adopt an acceptable alternative, then the EPA may promulgate federal regulations making
its own version of the criterion binding law in the state. The EPA finished developing most
of its nutrient-related Guideline documents by the end of 2001, and at that time, instructed
states to begin the process of adopting NNCs. By 2016, only twenty-eight states had adopted
NNCs that at least partially satisfy the EPA Guidelines. Some states were still working on
developing their own NNCs while others preferred alternative approaches. Thus far, EPA
1 For example, the problem was recognized in an international agreement with Canada during
that period.
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has only used its power to impose federal NNCs in three cases (one of which was long before
2001).
This chapter seeks to answer two questions: (1) What factors are associated with regula-
tory approaches taken by states to address nutrient pollution, and in particular associated
with a states adoption of an NNC? (2) Are differences in the form of restriction adopted by a
state associated with differences in implementation? In terms of implementation, I examine
the association between adopting an NNC and imposition of permit discharge limits. This
chapter only seeks to answer the question of how NNCs have worked in terms of translating
into permit limits. It does not seek to evaluate the overall program or other outcomes of
interest. Future work could do this.
Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 provides regulatory background. Section
4 describes the conceptual framework underlying the analysis. Section 5 describes the data
and econometric framework. Section 6 discusses econometric methods. Section 7 presents
the econometric results. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This study contributes to two main areas of research. The first relates to state approaches
to environmental regulation, to which this chapter contributes by examining state approaches
to water quality standards. The second relates to implementation of water quality standards
through permit limits.
2.2.1 State Approaches to Environmental Regulation
No prior empirical study in economics, to the best of the author’s knowledge, directly
analyzes different state approaches to water quality standards. Closely related literature an-
alyzes state approaches to environmental regulation decentralization. In the decentralization
literature, a number of studies indirectly infer factors related to a state voluntarily assuming
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control over aspects of its own regulatory program by comparing potentially related outcomes
in states that have and have not done so (Sigman 2003; Sjöberg and Xu 2018). In that con-
text a state can choose to establish its own program to replace an EPA directed program.
States are given the option of doing this under several federal environmental statutes. States
might voluntarily opt to take control over aspects of environmental regulation based on pref-
erences for stringency. That is, a state may prefer more or less stringent regulation than
would be provided by the EPA. Empirical results on this point are mixed. Sigman (2003)
finds some evidence that states decentralize to increase the stringency of environmental reg-
ulation. Sjöberg and Xu (2018) find that enforcement decentralization under RCRA is not
associated with significant changes in enforcement behaviors (inspection frequency, number
of detected violations, the amount of monetary penalties, and enforcement efficiency). This
suggests that stringency, in terms of enforcement, was not associated with state action on
decentralization.
Assuming program responsibility and adopting NNCs differ in that the former is com-
pletely voluntary. States have no mandatory obligation to assume responsibility and face
no potential recourse for failing to. In the NNC water quality context, states are legally
obligated to comply with EPA Guidance, and should they fail to, they face the prospect of
federally imposed regulations.
More similar to the present study Ramirez Harrington (2013) analyzes the relationship
between state adoption of environmental policies and potentially influential factors, although
not in the water quality context. She finds that prior firm-level environmental performance
and prior state-level enforcement history are not significant determinants of state policy
adoption.
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2.2.2 Implementing Water Quality Standards Through Permit Limits
Few studies analyze permit limits as an outcome, although many examine how they
relate to other outcomes, such as inspections and enforcement. Mickwitz (2003) comes
closest to considering the question considered here, although does so in a different regulatory
setting: Finland. Analyzing why some among a group of pulp and paper facilities are
assigned discharge limits for phosphorus, while others are not, he finds evidence that prior-
year discharges increase the probability of having a limit imposed, and that discharging into
the Baltic Sea (which is viewed as away from the land) decreases the probability. Other
factors examined had no systematic effect.
As discussed further in the next section, in the US considerations for setting permit
limits are set by law, and should apply similarly to similarly situated facilities. However,
there is some evidence that this may not always occur. Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) find
substantial variation in discharge limits imposed across wastewater discharging facilities and
over time, even within a single industry and for a relatively comparable set of facilities (major
facilities). DeShazo and Lerner (2004) find evidence of politically motivated discrimination
based on firm size in setting discharge limit stringency. In particular, larger firms were
found able to secure less stringent limits for their plants, but the firm size effect varied
greatly depending on local interest group influence. They analyze BOD and TSS limits
imposed on facilities in the pulp and paper industry.
2.2.3 Contributions of this Study
This study has three major contributions. First, it provides evidence related to the nu-
trient context otherwise lacking in the extant literature. Nutrient pollution has been a top
environmental regulatory priority for over a decade, but progress has been slow (Mississippi
River Collaborative 2016). Evaluating the effectiveness of the EPA approach relative to
others, and the factors associated with a state-level approach provides valuable information
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for policymakers. Second, it directly characterizes factors associated with state policy adop-
tion. Much prior work in this area only makes indirect inferences regarding such factors.
Third, it provides evidence on how adopted standards relate to the imposition of permit
limits. There is evidence that once imposed, firm compliance with effluent discharge limits
written into permits is generally strong. Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) find near universal
compliance with discharge limits, and strong over-compliance with those limits a majority of
the time, suggesting that tightening discharge limits is generally an effective means of lower-
ing discharges, or that currently imposed limits are not sufficiently stringent to be binding.
The contrast between, on the one hand, high compliance with imposed limits, and on the
other hand, excessive pollution and perceptions of lax control, suggests a need for further
examination of limit setting.
2.3 Regulatory Context
This section describes state water quality standards (which are the set of rules at the state-
level that an NNC would be in), and how they are implemented, including their relationship
to discharge permit limits. It also provides additional background specific to the nutrient
context.
2.3.1 Water Quality Standards
The CWA and EPA require states to adopt water quality standards to ensure minimally
adequate water quality levels. Water quality standards place restrictions on the ambient
levels of pollutants that can be in waters (Earnhart and Glicksman 2011). The specific
restrictions are referred to as “criteria.” Criteria are defined as “... elements of State water
quality standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative statements,
representing a quality of water that supports a particular use” (40 CFR 131.3(b)).
Under the CWA, EPA is required to develop and provide Guidance to assist states in
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developing water quality standards. EPA Guidance contains recommended criteria based
on the latest scientific information about how pollutants affect aquatic species and human
health. States are required to use that Guidance, to develop their own criteria, which are
then included in their water quality standards. States can set the criteria values based on
EPA Guidance, on a modified version of that Guidance driven by local conditions, or on
another scientifically defensible method. States are also free to enact more protective water
quality standards than required by the EPA.
State water quality standards and criteria must be approved by the EPA. They must
also be periodically reviewed and updated to reflect current scientific standards. If a state
fails to adopt a satisfactory criterion, the EPA can promulgate one for the state in the form
of a federal regulation. Once state adopted criteria are approved by the EPA (or federally
imposed criteria become final regulations) they become binding. Once binding, criteria are
implemented through permit limits, assessment and impairment designations, and through
Total Maximum Daily Loads.
2.3.2 Impaired Waters and TMDLs
Impaired water designations and Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) are two ways
water quality standards and criteria are implemented. If waters fail to satisfy applicable
criteria, those waters are considered ‘impaired.’ Since 1992, EPA has required states to
establish impaired waters lists every two years (CRS 2012). Once a waterbody is designated
as impaired, the state is required to establish a Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs). This
is a number which represents the maximum amount of the pollutant that can be present in the
water while still allowing water quality standards to be attained. That amount is allocated
among sources of pollution so that aggregate discharges from all sources do not exceed the
TMDL amount (Earnhart and Glicksman 2011, 40-41). EPA reviews and approves state
impaired waters lists and TMDLs. A water body typically remains on the impaired waters
list until it has a EPA approved TMDL. EPA sets a goal of attaining water quality standard
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criteria within eight to thirteen years of a water being listed as impaired (CRS 2012, 3). EPA
is required to develop impaired waters lists and make TMDL determinations for states that
do not do so on their own.
One of EPA’s reasons for promoting NNCs is that numeric criteria should facilitate im-
pairment designations and establishment of TMDLs. NNCs should facilitate impairment
designations because the determination could be made based on a single measured value.
NNCs would facilitate TMDL development and implementation by providing a set numer-
ical goal to be attained. More recently EPA has encouraged states to designate waters as
nutrient impaired even where numeric criteria are not in place and offered examples of ways
other states have justified doing so (EPA 2013b). Multi-jurisdiction TMDLs are also now
being used to address nutrient-related impairment. In 2010 EPA issued a multi-jurisdiction
nutrient-related TMDL for the Chesapeake Bay. At the time it was the largest TMDL ever
undertaken. The TMDL allocates needed reductions to seven different jurisdictions: New
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia, and DC. EPA’s goal is to
achieve all required reductions by 2025. EPA put ‘backstop’ measures in place at the outset
to ensure targets will be achieved and has threatened to do so again should progress be
found unsatisfactory. Nutrient trading programs are also being supported in the area (CRS
2012, 12-13). New York and Connecticut also have a multi-jurisdiction TMDL to address
nutrient-related impairment in the Long Island Sound. As discussed further below, some
states prefer to deal with nutrient pollution using TMDLs rather than NNCs.2
2.3.3 NPDES Permits and Polluting Facility Discharge Limits
The other avenue for implementation of water quality standard criteria, and the aspect an-
alyzed in this chapter, is through permit limits. The CWA makes discharge of pollutants into
2 TMDLs are not necessarily advantageous to states and there are cases where states have
opposed establishing a nutrient-related TMDL.
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the nation’s surface waters illegal unless done and in accordance with a valid permit. The Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program covers discharges
of industrial and municipal effluents into surface water bodies (Earnhart and Glicksman
2011, 33). These permits set ‘discharge limits’ constraining either quantities or concentra-
tions of particular pollutants that the permit holder is authorized to discharge into water at
a particular point. NPDES permits apply to and regulate ‘point source pollution.’ The term
‘point source’ is defined as: “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged” (CWA § 502(14)). Anything not covered by that
definition is a nonpoint source, and is not subject to federal regulation under the CWA.3
Individual facilities who are point-source polluters (or aspiring polluters) apply for NPDES
permits. Permits contain limits for each source of discharge and each pollutant to be dis-
charged. Permits are effective for a fixed term of at most five years. They can be modified,
revoked, or terminated for cause (Earnhart and Glicksman 2011, 39-40). Permits are issued
by the EPA or by an authorized state agency. If a state has established a permit program,
with EPA approval, then the designated state agency has primary responsibility for permit
administration. EPA retains veto power over individual state permits. If a state chooses
not to maintain an approved permitting program, EPA will handle permitting for the state.
The state and EPA share concurrent enforcement authority over issued permits (Earnhart
and Glicksman 2011, 34-35).
Broadly there are two types of permit limits, technology-based and water quality-based.
At the federal level, EPA sets technology-based “effluent limitations” to be put into permits
by permit writers. Federal effluent limitations are industry specific. States may adopt their
3 However, federal provision may in some circumstances require that a state take action to limit
nonpoint polluter discharges, such as, for example, where a TMDL is in place (because the TMDL
limit would include aggregate discharges from all sources).
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own effluent limitations, though are not required to.4 Federal effluent limitations are updated
periodically to reflect the current levels of pollution control deemed to be technologically and
economically achievable based on currently existing technology. Updating of federal effluent
limitations is one reason that otherwise similarly situated facilities might have different
technology-based permit limits. Another potential source of facility-based difference are
provisions subjecting newer facilities to more stringent effluent limitations. Variation in
state rules related to interpretation and application of limits can also result in permit limit
variation, even when the same underlying effluent limitation is used as the reference in
writing those limits (Earnhart and Glicksman 2011). If no effluent limitation exists for a
particular pollutant, then permit writers are to set facility-specific limits based on their own
best professional judgment. The best professional judgment limit should take into account
the same factors considered in establishing effluent limitations (e.g., technology-based).
Permits can also include water quality-based discharge limits. Water quality-based limits
are derived from state water quality standards. These can vary based on conditions and
characteristics of the receiving waterbody, just as water quality standards do. Water quality-
based limits are derived to ensure water quality standards are satisfied (typically meaning
that the criteria contained in the water quality standards will not be exceeded). Unlike
effluent limitation based permit limits, water quality-based limits are set without reference
to technology or feasibility. If a particular pollutant is covered by both a technology-based
effluent limitation and a water quality-based limitation, the resulting permit limit is set as
the more stringent (pollutant minimizing) of the two. If a TMDL is in effect for the receiving
waterbody, a permit limit may also incorporate a TMDL required discharge reduction.
Facilities can attempt to avoid or reduce a permit limit by obtaining a variance, or by
participating in a trading program. Both variances and trading programs are important in
4 In a case of conflicting state and federal effluent limitations, the more restrictive would apply
– meaning states cannot set their own effluent limitations to avoid more restrictive federal ones.
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the nutrient context, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
Sources of nutrient pollution include both point source dischargers (PSDs) and non-point
sources (NPSs). N and P enter waters, from agricultural operations (from livestock opera-
tions and row crop runoff), urban and suburban storm-water runoff, municipal wastewater
treatment systems/discharges, and air deposition (State–EPA 2009, 22). Many agricultural
sources are NPSs, and thus not subject to permit based restrictions. Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations (CAFOs) are an exception, subject to NPDES regulation. Urban storm-
water in areas covered in Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems and Combined Storm
Sewer Systems are subject to NPDES permit limits. Communities and growth outside these
areas are only subject to construction storm water general permits. Municipal wastewater
treatment facilities are subject to discharge limits, but as of 2009, only a small subset had
numeric N or P limits written into their permits (approximately 4.4 percent had numeric
limits for N, and 9.9 percent for P). On-site and decentralized wastewater treatment systems
fall outside the scope of the NPDES permit system (State–EPA 2009).
2.3.4 Federal Guidance for Nutrients
In 1998, EPA made nutrient overenrichment a top national environmental priority (EPA
1998a; EPA 1998b). It established a plan to develop a set of numeric criteria Guidelines.
The criteria would include different recommended values for each of four different waterbody
types, in each of fourteen different ecoregions, and for each of four different parameters. The
four waterbody types are: lakes, rivers, estuaries, and wetlands. Not all states have all four,
but all have at least two. Ecoregion boundaries do not follow jurisdictional borders, and most,
if not all, states contain more than one of the fourteen ecoregions. The four parameters are:
total nitrogen, total phosphorus, chlorophyll-A, and turbidity. This ‘menu of different values
approach,’ offering at least 56 options, contrasts the more common approach to regulating
water pollutants, which can typically be done with reference to a single value (EPA 1998b,
iv). Guidelines for three waterbody types were released by the end of 2001. At that point
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EPA directed states to submit Nutrient Criteria Development Plans (NCDPs) “to outline
their process for how and when they intend to adopt nutrient criteria into their water quality
standards” (EPA 2001a).
As of 2018, at least forty-six states have submitted plans. Fewer have adopted NNCs.
Every few years, the EPA makes a renewed declaration of interest in nutrient criteria devel-
opment. Table 2.1 provides a time line of federal-level policy statements and guidelines that
have come from the EPA in relation to its nutrient policy. EPA has the authority to impose
NNCs on states not adopting them on their own, but has made only limited use of that
authority. EPA has promulgated nutrient criteria in at least two states, and recently started
the process in another. In 1976 it promulgated NNCs for Arizona. They where withdrawn in
2003 when Arizona adopted its own criteria. In 2012 EPA promulgated numeric phosphorus
criteria for the Florida everglades. In 2017 EPA proposed NNCs for Missouri, which are still
pending.
2.3.5 State Adoption of NNCs and Other Approaches
States have been slow to adopt the type of numeric restrictions recommended by EPA and
some have outright refused to do so. A 2009 Inspector General Report found that the EPA
needed to accelerate the adoption of NNCs (EPA 2009). Around the same time, a report
from the State–EPA Nutrient Innovations Task Group called into question the usefulness of
NNCs (State–EPA 2009).
Regulatory efforts are complicated by the fact that naturally occurring nutrient levels
vary substantially across time and space, and are a function of many variables. Restrictions
can target the consequences of nutrient pollution, such as excessive plant growth or loss of
clarity in water. They can also target the pollutants that cause those consequences, nitrogen
(N) and phosphorus (P). In either case, the line between natural and unnatural can be
challenging to identify. Further complicating the matter, the level of nutrient presence in
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waters that will lead to the undesirable consequences of nutrient pollution can also vary
substantially. EPA Guidelines instruct states to adopt criteria for four parameters, two
causal and two responsive. Developing those four criteria for each of the possible waterbody-
ecoregion combinations within a state is a large project. The need for customization likely
contributes to the lack of success of a numeric approach in this context.
EPA argues that numeric criteria are needed for effectiveness, and specifically to be trans-
lated into permit limits, TMDLs, and TMDL-based permit limits. Additional considerations
include the need to protect downstream waterbodys and desire to identify nutrient problems
before ecosystem responses are observed. EPA has also argued that NNCs are more efficient
than site-specific implementation of narrative standards. However, NNCs are difficult to
develop and some states are hesitant to adopt them once developed (e.g., Montana). Some
states argue that numeric criteria are unnecessary. Some prefer to take a TMDL-based ap-
proach (e.g., Delaware, Ohio). Rather than developing an NNC, which can be used as a
basis for classifying waters as impaired and then developing a TMDL, these states prefer
to classify waters as impaired and develop TMDLs (presumably relying on their narrative
criteria for this purpose). Both NNCs and TMDLs should lead to permit limits. If NNCs
lead to more or faster TMDL development, all else constant NNCs would increase (or leave
unchanged) their impact on permit limits.
One aspect of EPA’s NNC approach to which states have objected is that it calls for set-
ting binding quantitative restrictions on causal parameters without reference to responsive
parameters. Opponents of this approach argue that its single-indicator nature is too restric-
tive, in that the criteria could be exceeded even in cases where the water is not impaired.
On this point, EPA notes that the criteria are meant to be protective of far field and down-
stream waters. Similarly, while nitrogen may not be the limiting nutrient in a particular
waterbody, it could become important upon reaching downstream waters. Additionally, the
limiting nutrient for a particular waterbody can vary over time as conditions change, both
across years and within years seasonally.
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2.4 Conceptual Framework
States have taken different approaches to addressing nutrient pollution. The ultimate
question of interest here is whether EPA’s NNC approach is associated with greater imple-
mentation, where implementation is defined in terms of permit limits.5 Because the approach
selected by a state may not be independent of its imposition of permit limits, the analysis
first explores factors associated with whether or not a state has chosen to adopt an NNC
approach. The remainder of this section describes the conceptual frameworks guiding the
empirical analysis.
2.4.1 State Adoption of Numeric Nutrient Criteria
Decision to adopt an NNC could be guided by a number of factors. This paper focuses
on three categories of factors and characteristics that may influence a state’s approach: (1a)
the extent and sources of the problem within the state (water quality, pollution source, and
cost related concerns); (1b) preferences and political climate; and (1c) state characteristics
(social, economic, demographic). Potentially important factors that are not addressed include
ecological diversity, resource availability, including issue specific special funding sources, as
well as upstream and downstream considerations. The following a priori expectations apply.
With respect to the extent of the problem, as it worsens, a state may be more likely to
take action. As a result, the state may be more likely to adopt an NNC. On the other hand,
the extent of the problem could also make it more difficult and cost prohibitive to address
the problem. The extent of the problem could also reflect a lack of willingness to or interest
in addressing the problem.
Competing water quality concerns may also play a role. As other sources of water quality
5 As indicated in the prior section, implementation can be broadly viewed as having three
aspects. Permit limits are one of those aspects.
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problems increase, a state may be less likely to take action to address nutrients. States
and environmental departments are resource limited. Developing NNCs requires substantial
resources.6 States with more non-nutrient water quality concerns may devote fewer resources
towards nutrients, and, as a result, may be less likely to adopt an NNC. General water quality
issues could also signal a lack of concern for environmental protection.
Sources of the problem may influence both the extent of the problem and the likelihood
of selecting an NNC approach to address the problem. More generally, larger relative con-
tributions to the problem from nonpoint source contributers may decrease the likelihood
that a state adopts an NNC. Greater agricultural activity is expected to increase nutrient
pollution, in turn increasing the extent of the problem. Agricultural sources are generally
not subject to regulation under the permit program, so they would not be restricted by
an NNC implemented through permit limits. Thus, as agricultural activity rises, an NNC
would place a greater burden on direct point sources while a larger share of the problem
would come from non-point sources. This in turn might make a state less likely to adopt an
NNC. An exception are CAFOs, which are subject to regulation under the permit program.
Greater livestock activity is expected to increase the extent of the problem, but, in the case
of CAFOs, could more effectively be addressed by an NNC. As a result, a state with greater
livestock activity may be more likely to adopt an NNC.
With respect to the second category, as others have pointed out, political factors may be
related to environmental outcomes and policies (Sjöberg and Xu 2018; Ramirez Harrington
2013; Helland 1998). As the political climate shifts more towards the Republican party, a
state is expected to be less likely to adopt an NNC because that political party cares less
about environmental protection.
With respect to the third category, holding all else constant, various social, economic,
and demographic characteristics of a state might be related to a state’s approach. The
6 See state NCDPs wherein states describe the steps involved in developing NNCs.
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economic climate can affect both available resources and the priority given to environmental
protection. Social and demographic characteristics are potentially correlated with individual
and community preferences and demand for environmental protection.
2.4.2 Implementation of Approaches
Implementation, in the form of permit limits, is potentially related to: (2a) the state
approach selected (EPA hypothesis); (2b) legal factors that permit writers are required
to consider, date of initial permit, industry technology, and the pollutants a facility will
discharge; and (2c) possibly other factors, which technically are not supposed to be taken
into account.
2.5 Data
This section describes the variables used in the empirical analysis and the sources of data
exploited to generate these variables.
2.5.1 State Nutrient Criterion Policy Data
This study compiles state-level data on nutrient criteria from multiple sources. The
analysis focuses on 2004 to 2014. States with NNCs are identified from the EPA web-
site. EPA keeps track of which states have adopted approved NNCs and when they were
adopted on its State Progress Toward Developing Numeric Nutrient Water Quality Criteria
webpage (Progress dashboard). Any state indicated as having a full or partial NNC are con-
sidered here to have at least partially adopted the EPA’s NNC approach. The EPA Progress
dashboard distinguishes between states with NNCs for N or P and states with NNCs for
chlorophyllA (one of the two response parameters for which EPA recommends states adopt
criteria). State status is reported as of 1998, 2008 and 2013 for N and P criteria, and only
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currently for chlorophyll-A criteria. Where possible, more specific years of adoption are ob-
tained from supplemental sources – namely from state NCDP and WQS documents, which
are all available from the EPA Progress dashboard.
Table 2.2 provides a timeline of state adoption. Prior to 2004, 13 states had adopted an
NNCs for N and/or P. During the sample period, 2004 to 2014, 10 more states adopt NNCs
for N and/or P. Two states without N/P NNCs are identified as having adopted a chlorophyll
A criterion before 2004. Another two adopted one during the sample period. The analysis
only considers first time adoption. No distinction is made for states who continue to develop
and adopt more NNCs in years following. Because of the extensive amount of work and time
that goes into developing NNCs, states will have likely made the decision to adopt an NNC
years before they actually do so. Moreover, before NNCs become binding they are reviewed
by the EPA and possibly at the state level. In adopting NNCs, states may be responding to
contemporaneous factors or to lagged factors.
2.5.2 Permit Limit and Facility Level Data
Permit, limit, and facility data are obtained from the EPA ICIS-NPDES database. Permit
limits are aggregated to the permit-limit effective year level, and then to the state-year level.
Permits generally correspond to facilities. Each permit can contain multiple limits. A permit
connected to any limit that begins in a given year is treated as a single observation for that
year. If any of the permit’s limits beginning in the year are N limits, it is treated as containing
an N limit. Similarly, if any of the permit’s limits beginning in the year are P limits, it is
treated as containing a P limit. N and P limits are identified using lists of N and P related
parameter codes obtained from the EPA Pollutant Loading Tool Technical Guidance Manual
and the Facilities Likely to Discharge technical documentation.7 Ammonia parameter codes
7 A parameter code identifies the particular pollutant (by name and form) to which a limit
applies. The limits data use over 2,000 unique parameter codes. The two sources combined identify
40 parameter codes associated with nitrogen and 26 parameter codes associated with phosphorus.
52
are excluded.
The sample of facilities is restricted to those likely to discharge N or P.8 These facilities
are identified using a procedure similar to that described in EPA (2013a). The primary
difference is that I do not rely on the condition that a firm has N or P discharges. Thus
classification is based primarily on industry codes.9 Permit writers consider industry in
determining which limits to impose, thus this classification approach may be similar to that
used in determining which parameters to include in limits when writing permits. Industry-
based facility sample restrictions are common in the literature (Earnhart and Rassier 2016;
Earnhart 2009). While permits generally last for up to five years, the limits imposed on
some facilities observed have start dates suggesting more frequent variation. States have the
discretion to require facilities to obtain new permits more frequently than the default five
years. States also have the discretion to modify and impose new limits on facilities during a
permit cycle. Any year in which a facility obtains new limits is counted as an observation.
The sample consists of 62,035 unique facilities classified as likely to discharge N or P,
corresponding to 136,814 facility-year observations. Table 2.3 summarizes the number of
facility years with N and P limits and monitoring requirements.
2.5.3 Water Quality
Water quality is difficult to measure. This chapter constructs a measure using EPA data
on impaired waterbodies. In particular, this study uses assessed waters data that is reported
in terms of two-year cycles. The waterbody level data is aggregated to the state-cycle
level. Both counts of impaired waterbodies and cardinal measures are computed. However,
because waterbody size is measured in different units, the cardinal analysis measures are
scaled using total state water area (in square miles). Variables are constructed for both
8 Prior to imposing this restriction, the sample contained 79,484 unique facilities (based on
NPDES permit ID). The restriction reduces the sample to 62,035 unique facilities.
9 Both SIC and NAICS codes are used as available.
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total impaired waterbodies and waterbodies with nutrient-related impairments. A number
of states are missing data for one or more cycle. For cycles lacking data, I impute the
average state value from cycles with non-missing data. An indicator is used to control for
this imputation and assess its impact on the results. In order to measure water quality in
the period leading up to a state’s possible adoption of an NNC, I use a lagged measure of
water quality (in all specifications).10 Table 2.4 reports summary statistics for the water
quality measures. The waterbody types indicated, lakes, rivers, and estuaries, correspond to
the units of measurement, acres, miles, and square miles.
2.5.4 Independent and Control Variables
Potentially important agricultural factors are captured by fertilizer expenditures, feed
expenditures, and livestock revenue. These variables should capture variation in the con-
tribution of agricultural non-point sources to nutrient pollution. Personal consumption ex-
penditures on recreational goods and services as a percent of total personal consumption
expenditures are used to capture the desire for improved water quality. Control variables
are included for economic, social, and demographic characteristics. Economic characteristics
include the unemployment rate, per-capita personal income, and industrial sector shares of
economic activity (real gross state product). Social and demographic characteristics include
age, gender, and education.
Political variables include state party affiliations and League of Conservation Voters
(LCV) scores. Governor party affiliation is expressed as democrat, republican, or non-major
party. State senate and house affiliations are expressed as the total membership affiliated
with each of major parties. The LCV score combines scores for each state’s federal con-
gressional members. LCV scores range from 0 to 100, representing the “proportion of time
10 Because impairment data are available on a two-year cycle, the one year lagged value equals
the two year lagged value.
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a legislator voted with the LCV’s position on selected measures that are considered pro-
environment.” The value can be interpreted as representing median voter preferences or as
a proxy for demand for environmental amenities (DeShazo and Lerner 2004; Sjöberg and Xu
2018).
Summary statistics for all states from 2004 to 2014 are reported in Table 2.5. The data
combines a number of sources. Unemployment data are from the BLS. Agricultural factors,
personal consumption expenditure, per-capita personal income, and sector share data are
from the BEA. Population, gender, and age breakdowns, along with land and water area
data are from the Census. Education is from the Current Population Survey. All variables
are at (or aggregated to) the state-year level. State governor and legislator party affiliations
are compiled from Klarner (2013) through 2011, and from the National Conference of State
Legislatures State Partisan Composition Data following 2011.
2.6 Econometric Methods
Adoption of an NNC is a modeled as a binary choice. Thus ordinary least squares is not
appropriate. I use a probit model, where Ys,t equals 1 if state s has adopted an NNC in year
t. The empirical model is:
Pr(Ys,t = 1|Xs,t) = Φ(β0 + β1Xs,t),
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and Xs,t is a vector of
factors potentially related to adoption of an NNC and state characteristics for state s at
time t. Fixed effects are not included in estimating the probit model (Greene 2002). States
are kept in the sample after adopting an NNC. Theoretically, a state could modify or reverse
its criteria.11 Furthermore, states are required to readopt their water quality standards every
11 In some cases states gradually adopt NNCs over several years as criteria are developed to cover
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three years.
Four baseline specifications are estimated. Model (1a) includes water quality measures
and non-point source contribution measures (population density and agricultural factors).
Model (1b) adds preference-related variables (recreation consumption and political factors).
Model (1c) adds state characteristics (gender, age, education, personal income, and industry
shares). Model (1d) includes an indicator variable for EPA regions.
As a robustness check, I estimate each of the baseline specifications using alternative
versions of the water quality measure. Baseline estimates are based on the overall count of
impaired waters. Alternative versions break down those counts by waterbody type (lake,
river, estuary), and use scaled versions of the cardinal measures, also broken down by water-
body type.
Permit limit regressions are run using N limits, P limits, and both N and P limits as
outcomes. Models (2a), (2c), and (2e) include lagged NNC adoption and water quality
measures as regressors. Models (2b), (2d), and (2f) additionally control for industry shares.
Where the outcome variables is specified as a count of limits, I estimate versions of the
models controlling for the overall total.
2.7 Econometric Results
Table 2.6 reports baseline probit results using contemporaneous factors. For reference,
Table 2.9 reports analogous OLS results. The probit estimates can be interpreted for sign
and significance of the regressors, or for predicted impacts of particular changes. Estimated
impacts will vary based on initial values, making results difficult to generalize.
Impaired waters are significant in most of the Table 2.6 specifications. Estimates sug-
gest non-nutrient related impacts are negatively related while nutrient related impacts are
additional waterbodies.
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positively related. Note that is not possible to comment on the causal direction of this rela-
tionship. A state that adopts an NNC should potentially have more impairment listings in
subsequent cycles. Once designated impaired, a particular waterbody will remain on the list
during subsequent cycles until a TMDL is established. Thus even lagging the measure will
not break the connection. Water area per person (size of water cover relative to the popu-
lation) is negatively related to adoption on an NNC, while population density is positively
related. Both are statistically significant in most specifications. Agricultural factor results
are mixed. Live stock revenue from pigs has a negative and statistically significant relation-
ship in all specifications. Farm spending on fertilizer has a positive but not statistically
significant relationship in all specifications. Democrats in the state-level House of Repre-
sentatives and federal House of Representative’s LCV scores are both negatively related to
NNC adoption, with statistically significant estimates in all specifications. Democrats in the
state Senate on the other hand has a positive and statistically significant relationship with
NNC adoption in all specifications. Recreational consumption spending and governor party
affiliation results are mixed. State characteristics results are also reported in the table. One
in particular that jumps out is that the portion of the population with a bachelors degree or
higher has a positive and statistically significant relationship with NNC adoption.
Table 2.7 shows the same set of probit results using water impairment counts broken
down by waterbody type. The same regressor sets are used although some rows are omitted
in printed results. Non-nutrient impairment estimates are negative for each waterbody type,
but only rivers are statistically significant across all specifications. Results are less consistent
with respect to N/P-related impairments when broken down by waterbody type. Table 2.8
reports results using the scaled cardinal water quality measures. These results suggest a
split between rivers and lakes, with both nutrient and non-nutrient impaired lakes having
positive, statistically significant relationships in all specifications, while both nutrient and
non-nutrient impaired rivers have negative, statistically significant relationships in all speci-
fications. Across all tables, water cover relative to the population and livestock revenue from
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pigs have the most persistently significant coefficients.
As a robustness check, in Table 2.10 I report results model 1(b) for a number of alternative
specifications each including state fixed effects. These results support similar conclusions,
though have stronger significance. The specifications include a linear probability model,
probit model, logistic model, and conditional logistic model. One potentially relevant fixed
state factor that comes to mind are the up stream and down stream relationships between
states, at least in terms of where borders the lie. There are likely a number of other time
invariant factors between states.
Table 2.11 reports permit limit regressions without controlling for overall total new limits.
Results suggest that lagged adoption of an NNC has a positive and statistically significant
relationship to N limits and to N and P limits. The relationship to P limits is positive,
but not statistically significant. Interestingly, estimated coefficients for the variable NRC,
numeric response criteria. This variable is equal to one for states initially adopting an
NNC for a response but not a causal nutrient parameter. Estimates suggest those states
impose fewer nutrient related permit limits. Nutrient-related impairment has a positive
relationship in all specifications, which is statistically significant in all but one. Non-nutrient
related impairment has a negative relationship, which statistically significant in all but one
specification. Table 2.12 reports analogous results but controls for total limits imposed in
all specifications. Again, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between
adopting an NNC and imposing N limits or N and P limits. The relationship with imposing
P limits is negative but not statistically significant. NRC has a negative and statistically
significant relationship in all specifications. Again, nutrient related impairment has a positive
relationship, and non-nutrient related impairment has negative relationship.
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2.8 Conclusion
This study provides evidence concerning factors related to a state’s decision to adopt
an NNCs. In particular, it examines how the effect of water quality, agricultural, non-
point source, and political factors can help in understanding why a state might hesitate to
adopt an NNC. It also looks at the relationship between adopting an NNC and imposing
nutrient related permit limits. This study does not attempt to evaluate which approach to
nutrient regulation is the best, nor does it attempt to evaluate the overall effectiveness of
any approach.
I find a robust positive relationship between nutrient impaired waters and adoption of an
NNC but a robust negative relationship between non-nutrient impaired waters and adoption
of an NNC. This may be explainable in terms of resource limitations and setting priorities.
A caveat to this finding, however, is that measures of impairment do not factor in when a
water is first designated impaired and are not consistently available for all states in all time
periods. Furthermore, impairment designations depend on assessments which potentially
vary for a number of reasons.
I also find a significant persistent negative relationship between squares miles of water per
person. Larger water per person may suggest, among other things, fewer available resources
to devote to developing NNCs for any particular set of waterbodies. It may also relate to
nutrient impairment potential.
In terms of agricultural factors, results are mixed with one exception. There is a persistent
negative relationship between pig revenue and adoption of an NNC across specifications. The
relationship between NNC adoption and livestock presence is complicated by the fact that
some livestock operations, CAFOs, are subject to regulation under the CWA, while others
are not. A state with a large non-regulated livestock presence may hesitate to adopt an
NNC as it would shift a disproportionate share of responsibility to point sources. The same
reasoning applies to row crop presence. Trading programs, state specific regulation of non-
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point sources, and programs aimed at reducing fertilizer application may help alleviate such
concerns. To account for the presence of non-agricultural non-point sources, I control for
land area population density. Future work could do more to study the role of non-point
sources. For example, new building permits or motor vehicle use could potentially be used
as a control variables. In the case of new building permits, it may be possible to distinguish
those in MS4 or other NPDES covered areas from those outside such areas.
In terms of the relationship between political affiliations and adopting an NNC, one of
the interesting observations, is the split between house and senate democrat percents. State
senate democrat affiliation has a persistent positive relationship with adoption of an NNC.
At the same time state house democrat affiliation has a persistent negative relationship. This
could be driven by correlation in the variables. Alternatively, it could reflect a difference
between house and senate members. One possibility is that house representatives are more
focused on particular issues within their districts, while senators tend to focus more on bigger
picture concerns.
The second outcome explored was imposition of permit limits following adoption of an
NNC. A potential concern in this context is endogeneity, although the use of lagged variables
helps to mitigate this concern. Future research could address this point further. Waterbody
specific regulations offer rich variation within and across states that could potentially be used
in doing so. The permit limit results indicate that likely N/P dischargers in NNC states are
more likely to be given N limits, but not necessarily P limits. Results also indicate that NRC
state facilities are less likely to have nutrient permit limits. This supports EPAs position
that response variable criteria are insufficient, at least for the purpose of permit limits. That
said, future work should include other dimensions of implementation to get a more complete
and meaningful picture.
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2.9 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: EPA Action and Guidance on Nutrient Policy
Date Action
February 1998 Clean Water Action Plan calling for establishment of
numeric nutrient criteria
June 1998 National Strategy
November 1999 Protocol for Developing Nutrient TMDLs
April 2000 Technical Guidance, Lakes and Reservoirs
July 2000 Technical Guidance, Rivers and Streams
January 2001 Notice of Nutrient Criteria in Federal Register
October 2001 Technical Guidance, Estuarine and Coastal Marine
November 2001 Grumbles Memo, instructions to states
May 2007 Grumbles Memo, renewed effort calling on states to
“take bold steps”
June 2008 Technical Guidance, Wetlands
December 2008 Report on state adoption of numeric nutrient criteria
August 2009 Nutrient Innovations Task Group, “Urgent Call to Ac-
tion”
August 2009 Evaluation Report, ‘need to accelerate adoption’
March 2011 Stoner Memo, ‘reaffirming the commitment’
September 2016 Beauvais Memo, ‘renewed call to action’
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Table 2.2: State Adoption of NNC
Year Adopted an N/P NNC Adopted a Chlor A NNC
1998 AZ, CA, GA, HI, IL, MN,













Earliest year state had least partially adopted an NNC. Italics indi-
cates exact year unknown – states are known to have adopted policy
by the year indicated. Analysis begins in 2004. States that adopted an
NNC prior to that are listed but exact years are not recorded. Sources:
EPA 2018a, state Nutrient Criteria Development Plans.
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Figure 2.1: State Nutrient Approaches Map
Blue denotes states that had adopted an NNC by the indicated year. NRC states had only adopted
an NRC by the end of the period examined. Policy classifications based on those used by EPA.
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Table 2.3: N/P Permit Limits in Facility-Year Sample
Operative Limits Monitoring without Limits
Only N 6,553 (4.8%) 15,615 (11.4%)
Only P 10,123 (7.4%) 17,084 (12.5%)
Both N and P 2,858 (2.1%) 10,656 (7.8%)
Numbers are based on the sample of 136,814 facility-year observations
from facilities likely to discharge N or P (described in the Section 5.2
of the text). Analysis covers limits that became effective from 2004 to
2014. Sources: EPA and author calculation.
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Table 2.4: State Water Quality Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Imputed Water Quality 550 0.205 0.404 0 1
Count Measures :
Impaired Waters 550 1,237 1,774 60 13,346
Impaired Lakes 550 188 380 0 2,793
Impaired Rivers 550 970 1,527 25 11,384
Impaired Estuaries 550 86 220 0 1,703
N/P Impaired Waters 550 322 426 1 2,429
N/P Impaired Lakes 550 61 89 0 530
N/P Impaired Rivers 550 230 366 0 2,409
N/P Impaired Estuaries 550 34 130 0 1,159
Cardinal Measures :
Impaired Lakes (acres) 550 252,592 510,075 0 3,745,678
Impaired Rivers (miles) 550 9,314 10,087 94 61,085
Impaired Estuaries (sq miles) 550 2,974 33,623 0 775,815
N/P Impaired Lakes (acres) 550 111,242 198,345 0 1,210,712
N/P Impaired Rivers (miles) 550 3,014 4,376 0 33,764
N/P Impaired Estuaries (sq miles) 550 1,043 16,803 0 393,274
Scaled Cardinal Measures :
Impaired Lakes 550 113.8 138.6 0 512.5
Impaired Rivers 550 7.62 11.17 0.003 71.23
Impaired Estuaries 550 0.36 4.50 0 105.34
N/P Impaired Lakes 550 58.21 97.53 0 451.19
N/P Impaired Rivers 550 1.91 3.62 0 34.27
N/P Impaired Estuaries 550 0.172 2.28 0 53.4
Based on data reported for 2002 to 2016 cycles. Waterbodies are classified “N/P Impaired”
if they are impaired and the cause of impairment is recorded as: nutrients, noxious aquatic
plants, algal growth, organic enrichment/oxygen depletion, or turbidity. Ammonia impair-
ments are not included. Scaled measures are weighted by square miles of water in the state.
See text for additional details. Sources: EPA, Census, and author’s calculation.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics, 50 US States, 2004-2014
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
State Characteristics
Male (%) 550 49.34 0.75 48.2 52.3
Young Age (%) 544 14.21 0.86 12.1 18.7
Prime Age (%) 550 40.8 1.6 36.8 45.2
Old Age (%) 550 19 2.2 12 26
Bachelor-Higher Educ (%) 550 28.9 5.4 15.8 43.4
Log Personal Inc Per Cap 550 10.6 0.18 10.1 11.1
Pop Density 550 194 258.6 1.16 1,214
Water/Pop 550 0.003 0.019 0.0001 0.14
Rec G/S PCEs (%) 550 6.9 0.731 4.3 8.7
Growth Rate 550 1.41 2.68 -9.33 17
Unemployment Rate 550 6.3 2.2 2.6 13.7
Industry Shares (%)
Natural Resource/Mining 550 4.5 6.3 0.14 34.6
Construction 550 4.7 1.2 2.8 11.1
Manufacturing 550 12.4 5.7 1.5 32.2
Trade 550 17.4 2.4 10.7 23.2
Financial 550 18.6 5.2 9.8 43.2
Prof Business Services 550 10.2 2.8 3.6 19.4
Education/Health 550 8.3 1.8 3.8 13.3
Leisure/Hospitality 550 4.0 2.2 2.5 18.8
Public Administration 550 14 3.1 9.1 25.6
Political Factors
Governor Democrat 550 0.467 0.499 0 1
Senate Democrat (%) 539 49.4 17.6 13.3 96
Senate Republican (%) 539 50.2 17.6 4 86.7
House Democrat (%) 539 50.5 16.1 13.3 92
House Republican (%) 539 49.2 16.2 8 86.7
House LCV 550 47.1 28.23 0 100
Agricultural Factors
Fertilizer Expenditure 550 0.649 0.753 0.002 4.430
Feed Expenditure 550 0.923 1.099 0.003 6.220
Meat Revenue 550 1.949 2.908 0.005 16.266
Cattle Revenue 550 1.395 2.446 0.001 15.483
Pig Revenue 550 0.451 1.101 0.0002 10.080
Poultry Revenue 550 0.713 1.040 0.000 5.552
Other LS Revenue 550 0.103 0.120 0.002 1.140
Dairy Revenue 550 0.672 1.205 0.001 9.358
See text for description and source information. Missing political factor obser-
vations are from Nebraska, which has a unicameral, nonpartisan state legisla-
ture. Missing observations of young population are from Hawaii. Agricultural
factors are all divided by one million.
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Table 2.6: Probit NNC Regression Results
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
Non-N/P Impaired (n) -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
N/P Impaired (n) 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Imputed WQ 0.1973 -0.0061 -0.2248 -0.7901∗∗
(0.1637) (0.1752) (0.2286) (0.3239)
Water/Population -232.1575∗∗∗ -396.2697∗∗∗ -364.8467∗∗∗ -338.7930∗∗
(72.0582) (90.9970) (115.8992) (150.1445)
Population Density 0.0006∗∗ 0.0002 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Fertilizer Spending 0.0538 0.2462 0.3509 0.1543
(0.1223) (0.1524) (0.2361) (0.3660)
Feed Spending 0.2813∗∗ 0.2612 0.0327 -0.5941∗∗
(0.1281) (0.1685) (0.1997) (0.2904)
Cattle Revenue -0.0478 -0.0074 0.0759 0.3841∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0465) (0.0575) (0.0923)
Pig Revenue -0.3093∗∗∗ -0.4423∗∗∗ -0.3091∗∗ -0.5209∗∗
(0.0820) (0.0994) (0.1216) (0.2309)
Poultry Revenue -0.0455 -0.0807 0.1986 0.8133∗∗∗
(0.0812) (0.1016) (0.1483) (0.2373)
Recreational PCEs 0.2065∗∗ -0.0408 0.5011∗∗
(0.0956) (0.1706) (0.2411)
Democrat Governor -0.2234 0.2265 0.3878∗
(0.1360) (0.1786) (0.2326)
Senate Democrat (%) 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.1053∗∗∗ 0.1263∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0135) (0.0175)
House Democrat (%) -0.0236∗∗∗ -0.0870∗∗∗ -0.0946∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0157) (0.0179)




Probit NNC Regressions, Table 2.6 continued
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
Male Population 0.7625∗∗ -0.1293
(0.3316) (0.6060)
Old Age Population 0.1483∗∗ 0.1633∗
(0.0627) (0.0880)
Bachelor Educ 0.0932∗∗ 0.2025∗∗∗
(0.0382) (0.0554)
Log Pers Inc Per Cap -0.4905 0.5843
(1.1758) (1.5261)














Constant -0.0260 -2.6057∗∗∗ -37.8801∗ -17.7135
(0.1427) (0.7328) (19.9025) (34.2558)
Region Dummies ✓
Observations 550 539 539 539
Log Likelihood -328.3528 -272.3178 -183.4569 -140.9481
Akaike Inf. Crit. 678.7056 576.6356 420.9139 353.8962
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.7: Probit NNC Regression Results, Waterbody Type Count WQ Measures
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
Non-N/P Impaired Lakes (n) 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Non-N/P Impaired Rivers (n) -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0004∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Non-N/P Impaired Estuaries (n) -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0019∗∗ -0.0018
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0012)
N/P Impaired Lakes (n) 0.0021∗∗ 0.0014∗ 0.0015 0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0013)
N/P Impaired Rivers (n) 0.0005 0.0006∗ 0.000001 -0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
N/P Impaired Estuaries (n) 0.0037 0.0058 -0.0017 -0.0002
(0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Imputed WQ 0.2517 -0.0109 -0.1748 -0.7596∗∗
(0.1721) (0.1856) (0.2320) (0.3262)
Water/Population -260.6110∗∗∗ -431.2657∗∗∗ -340.6144∗∗∗ -293.4894∗
(75.6764) (97.2897) (117.9974) (154.5448)
Population Density 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Fertilizer Spending 0.0124 0.2177 0.2978 0.1395
(0.1282) (0.1557) (0.2478) (0.3760)
Feed Spending 0.2823∗∗ 0.2293 0.0762 -0.5347∗
(0.1301) (0.1669) (0.2086) (0.2966)
Cattle Revenue -0.0432 0.0067 0.0704 0.3753∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0460) (0.0587) (0.0923)
Pig Revenue -0.3595∗∗∗ -0.4569∗∗∗ -0.3273∗∗ -0.5048∗∗
(0.0906) (0.1032) (0.1309) (0.2416)
Poultry Revenue -0.0264 -0.0587 0.2014 0.8034∗∗∗
(0.0823) (0.1013) (0.1536) (0.2394)
Recreational PCEs 0.2190∗∗ -0.0114 0.5237∗∗
(0.0980) (0.1728) (0.2437)
Constant -0.0320 -2.7262∗∗∗ -39.0557∗ -21.3184
(0.1468) (0.7607) (20.5457) (37.0447)
Political Factors ✓ ✓ ✓
State Characteristics ✓ ✓
Industry Shares ✓ ✓
EPA Region Dummies ✓
Observations 550 539 539 539
Log Likelihood -318.5436 -265.8147 -180.6032 -140.3220
Akaike Inf. Crit. 667.0873 571.6293 423.2064 360.6441
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.8: Probit NNC Results, Scaled Cardinal WQ Measures
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
Non-N/P Impaired Lakes 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0020∗ 0.0073∗∗∗
(acres/sq. miles) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0021)
Non-N/P Impaired Rivers -0.0259∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗ -0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0935∗∗∗
(miles/sq. miles) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0117) (0.0210)
Non-N/P Impaired Estuaries -1.0788∗∗ -0.9769∗ -1.2204 -1.2353
(sq. miles/sq. miles) (0.4486) (0.5876) (0.7465) (1.2554)
N/P Impaired Lakes 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗
(acres/sq. miles) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0020)
N/P Impaired Rivers -0.0525∗∗ -0.0522∗ -0.1187∗∗∗ -0.2149∗∗∗
(miles/sq. miles) (0.0237) (0.0276) (0.0372) (0.0465)
N/P Impaired Estuaries 1.0562∗∗∗ 1.1070∗∗∗ 1.3609∗∗∗ 1.8339∗∗
(sq. miles/sq. miles) (0.3444) (0.3837) (0.4939) (0.7649)
Imputed WQ 0.3251∗ 0.1912 -0.3618 -0.8089∗∗
(0.1662) (0.1869) (0.2437) (0.3709)
Water/Population -224.6808∗∗∗ -506.5876∗∗∗ -454.7491∗∗∗ -806.8795∗
(86.7067) (107.9854) (171.9124) (437.9112)
Population Density 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Fertilizer Spending 0.1772 0.3592∗∗ 0.6568∗∗∗ 0.0215
(0.1197) (0.1449) (0.2453) (0.4954)
Feed Spending 0.1702 0.1810 -0.2322 -0.5929∗
(0.1313) (0.1827) (0.2144) (0.3400)
Cattle Revenue 0.0072 0.0520 0.2364∗∗∗ 0.6294∗∗∗
(0.0380) (0.0549) (0.0693) (0.1262)
Pig Revenue -0.3950∗∗∗ -0.5081∗∗∗ -0.3448∗∗∗ -0.6146∗∗
(0.0901) (0.1069) (0.1272) (0.2723)
Poultry Revenue 0.0219 -0.1151 0.1225 0.5232∗
(0.0856) (0.1084) (0.1568) (0.2675)
Recreational PCEs 0.1334 -0.2542 -0.1594
(0.1000) (0.1881) (0.3014)
Constant -0.3292∗ -2.1784∗∗∗ -27.5957 68.8977
(0.1785) (0.8011) (21.3064) (42.5180)
Political Factors ✓ ✓ ✓
State Characteristics ✓ ✓
Industry Shares ✓ ✓
EPA Region Dummies ✓
Observations 550 539 539 539
Log Likelihood -319.8129 -259.4783 -170.3744 -116.8246
Akaike Inf. Crit. 669.6257 558.9567 402.7489 313.6493
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.9: OLS NNC Regression Results
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
Non-N/P Impaired (n) -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
N/P Impaired (n) 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗ -0.00001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Imputed WQ 0.0737 0.0029 -0.0077 -0.0704
(0.0580) (0.0538) (0.0498) (0.0463)
Water/Population -2.9002∗∗∗ -3.9584∗∗∗ -2.4900∗∗∗ -5.5957∗∗∗
(0.3161) (0.4579) (0.9571) (1.4622)
Population Density 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Fertilizer Spending 0.0133 0.0524 0.0818∗∗ 0.0481
(0.0405) (0.0346) (0.0349) (0.0449)
Feed Spending 0.0748∗∗ 0.0399 0.0123 -0.1088∗∗
(0.0334) (0.0325) (0.0352) (0.0458)
Cattle Revenue -0.0033 0.0176 0.0207 0.0777∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0126) (0.0159)
Pig Revenue -0.0857∗∗∗ -0.1057∗∗∗ -0.0655∗∗∗ -0.0075
(0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0247)
Poultry Revenue 0.0112 0.0074 0.0529 0.1019∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0324) (0.0336) (0.0336)
Recreational PCEs 0.0495∗ -0.0294 0.0385
(0.0285) (0.0334) (0.0327)
Democrat Governor -0.0556 0.0365 0.0511
(0.0426) (0.0415) (0.0356)
Senate Democrat (%) 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0018)
House Democrat (%) -0.0077∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0022)




OLS NNC Regressions, Table 2.9 continued
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
Male Population 0.1225∗ -0.1007
(0.0668) (0.0789)
Old Age Population 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.0173
(0.0118) (0.0120)
Bachelor Educ 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0076)
Log Pers Inc Per Cap -0.4833∗∗ -0.2136
(0.2297) (0.2214)














Constant 0.3737∗∗∗ -0.3261 -2.3890 4.9323
(0.0416) (0.2193) (3.6900) (4.1641)
Region Dummies ✓
Observations 550 539 539 539
R2 0.1343 0.2772 0.4933 0.5824
Adjusted R2 0.1182 0.2565 0.4676 0.5533
Residual Std. Error 0.4686 0.4306 0.3644 0.3338
F Statistic 8.3615∗∗∗ 13.3716∗∗∗ 19.1715∗∗∗ 20.0419∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.10: Robustness Check, NNC Regression Alternative Specifications
LPM Probit Logistic Conditional
Logistic
(1b) (1b) (1b) (1b)
Non-N/P Impaired -0.00001 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0000)
N/P Impaired 0.00004 0.1680∗∗∗ 0.5602∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.0029) (0.0173) (0.0000)
Water/Population 3.4194 686.3201∗∗∗ 2,217.5670∗∗∗ -16,923.6500∗∗∗
(2.4886) (42.5390) (287.5145) (0.0000)
Population Density 0.0060∗∗∗ 3.8480∗∗∗ 13.0287∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0483) (0.4050) (0.0000)
Fertilizer Spending 0.0143 21.8594∗∗∗ 69.5213∗∗∗ 0.0196∗∗∗
(0.0387) (0.7841) (7.9553) (0.0000)
Feed Spending 0.1016∗∗ 34.3224∗∗∗ 116.0907∗∗∗ 0.4980∗∗∗
(0.0467) (0.6702) (6.5930) (0.0000)
Cattle Revenue -0.0034 -16.8942∗∗∗ -55.5174∗∗∗ -0.2642∗∗∗
(0.0400) (0.3936) (2.2102) (0.0000)
Pig Revenue -0.0447 -0.9396∗ -4.3005 -0.4578∗∗∗
(0.0329) (0.5049) (5.0730) (0.0000)
Poultry Revenue -0.1363∗∗∗ -50.0201∗∗∗ -166.3208∗∗∗ -0.5159∗∗∗
(0.0402) (1.2005) (8.3933) (0.0000)
Recreational PCEs -0.1333∗∗∗ -27.7720∗∗∗ -91.1585∗∗∗ -1.0321∗∗∗
(0.0448) (0.9279) (6.0396) (0.0000)
Democrat Governor 0.0315 -7.0577∗∗∗ -22.1101∗∗∗ 0.5565∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.4015) (2.5221) (0.0000)
Senate Democrat 0.0045∗∗ -0.5260∗∗∗ -1.6960∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0242) (0.1580) (0.0000)
House Democrat -0.0048∗∗ 0.5493∗∗∗ 1.7306∗∗∗ -0.0311∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0557) (0.3495) (0.0000)
House LCV Score -0.0021∗∗∗ -0.6729∗∗∗ -2.2242∗∗∗ -0.0074∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0147) (0.0849) (0.0000)
Constant 0.4000 68.3015∗∗∗ 226.8753∗∗∗
(0.3189) (2.8392) (18.3330)
State FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓∗
Observations 539 539 539 539
R2 0.8568 0.0723
Adjusted R2 0.8382
Max. Possible R2 0.1774
F Statistic 45.9446∗∗∗
LR Test 40.4633∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test 62.7558∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
73
Table 2.11: OLS N/P Permit Limit Regression Results
New N Limit New P Limit New N and P Limits
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
Lag NNC 9.5252∗∗ 11.9825∗∗∗ 5.9378 5.8829 4.9684∗∗ 6.5978∗∗
(3.9481) (3.8245) (3.7804) (4.5166) (2.5338) (2.6961)
Lag NRC -3.4496∗∗∗ -2.1244 -3.4859 -5.5396 -0.9576∗∗ -0.5084
(0.8984) (1.5291) (3.0472) (3.8399) (0.4348) (0.8519)
Non-N/P Imp -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0009∗∗ -0.0007∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003)
N/P Imp 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0024 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Nat Rsrc/Min 0.9584∗∗∗ -0.4930 0.5201∗∗∗
(0.2347) (0.5390) (0.1416)
Construction 0.0004 -1.9075∗ 0.1563
(0.8386) (1.1555) (0.4842)
Trade 1.3342∗∗∗ 1.0758∗∗ 0.8402∗∗
(0.4850) (0.5306) (0.3749)
Prof/Bus Serv 2.1633∗∗∗ 1.4123∗ 1.2585∗∗∗
(0.5909) (0.7517) (0.4456)
Fin 1.1613∗∗ -0.0318 0.5790∗∗
(0.4648) (0.4661) (0.2769)
Leis/Hosp 0.4637 -0.9416 0.3171∗∗
(0.2966) (0.5771) (0.1592)
Edu/Health 1.3710∗∗∗ -0.5104 0.9097∗∗∗
(0.5150) (0.9233) (0.2626)
Constant 5.3361∗∗∗ -79.3845∗∗∗ 10.2497∗∗∗ -1.4447 0.9064 -49.3810∗∗∗
(1.0494) (19.6452) (3.0261) (35.7987) (0.5976) (13.7177)
Observations 547 547 547 547 547 547
R2 0.0303 0.0759 0.0105 0.0367 0.0346 0.0685
Adjusted R2 0.0214 0.0551 0.0014 0.0150 0.0257 0.0476
Res. Std. Err. 30.6331 30.0999 38.8859 38.6195 19.0307 18.8157
F Statistic 3.3831∗∗∗ 3.6548∗∗∗ 1.1509 1.6935∗ 3.8790∗∗∗ 3.2733∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.12: OLS N/P Permit Limit Regression Results 2
New N Limit New P Limit New N and P Limits
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
Lag NNC 5.3982∗∗ 6.8330∗∗∗ -1.1354 -2.2705 2.5025∗ 3.5404∗∗
(2.1588) (2.1964) (3.5947) (4.6955) (1.3018) (1.4882)
Lag NRC -11.5953∗∗ -9.3992∗∗ -17.4468∗∗ -17.0581∗∗ -5.8246∗ -4.8276∗
(4.5983) (4.1274) (6.9761) (6.8997) (2.9951) (2.6700)
New Lims 0.0515∗∗ 0.0577∗∗∗ 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.0914∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗ 0.0343∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0211) (0.0235) (0.0244) (0.0140) (0.0146)
Non-N/P Imp -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0008∗∗ -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
N/P Imp 0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Nat Rsrc/Min 1.2438∗∗∗ -0.0411 0.6895∗∗∗
(0.2846) (0.3418) (0.1898)
Const 1.7123∗∗ 0.8030 1.1727∗∗∗
(0.6964) (1.1304) (0.4057)
Trade 0.6079 -0.0741 0.4090
(0.4120) (0.5809) (0.2787)
Prof Bus Serv 1.1648∗∗∗ -0.1687 0.6656∗∗
(0.4451) (0.9002) (0.3050)
Fin 1.8068∗∗∗ 0.9902∗∗∗ 0.9622∗∗∗
(0.5811) (0.3227) (0.3705)
Leis/Hosp 0.8826∗∗∗ -0.2782 0.5659∗∗∗
(0.2901) (0.3475) (0.1760)
Edu/Hlth 2.3661∗∗∗ 1.0652∗∗ 1.5005∗∗∗
(0.5951) (0.5404) (0.3634)
Constant -2.7647 -97.5915∗∗∗ -3.6342 -30.2727 -3.9337∗∗ -60.1909∗∗∗
(2.7774) (22.0375) (2.2170) (24.6513) (1.8909) (15.7366)
Observations 547 547 547 547 547 547
R2 0.2340 0.3107 0.3895 0.4094 0.2222 0.2820
Adjusted R2 0.2255 0.2938 0.3827 0.3949 0.2136 0.2645
Res. Std. Err. 27.2508 26.0213 30.5731 30.2684 17.0975 16.5351
F Statistic 27.5004∗∗∗ 18.4768∗∗∗ 57.4164∗∗∗ 28.4151∗∗∗ 25.7144∗∗∗ 16.1016∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Unemployment Insurance Receipt on Nonemployment Duration
and Subsequent Job Quality: Evidence from the U.S.
3.1 Introduction
The US unemployment insurance (UI) system provides weekly payments to qualifying
workers who have lost their jobs. In 2016, 32 billion dollars in unemployment insurance
benefits were paid to 6.2 million beneficiaries in the US (US Dep’t of Labor). Roles served
by the UI system from an economic theory perspective include facilitating efficient search,
smoothing consumption, and potentially serving as an automatic stabilizer during recessions.
If benefits result in job quality improvement, there are also potential productivity gains.
From individual quality of life and social perspectives, UI benefits potentially play a hugely
important role in protecting cash-strapped individuals from the whims of industry shocks
and reallocations. The major concern surrounding UI benefits, is that by paying individuals
while they remain out of work, the system creates incentives for individuals to remain out of
work longer, resulting in resource underutilization. This is a moral hazard concern. Benefit
availability could also increase individual’s willingness to accept more risky employment,
cause individuals to put less effort into retaining employment, and crowd out forms of self-
insurance (such as private savings, and spousal employment).
Theoretically, UI benefits are expected to increase unemployment durations, although
not necessarily through a moral hazard effect. The impact on job quality is theoretically
ambiguous. Empirical evidence supports the view of UI benefits as increasing unemployment
durations, in terms of both benefit level (Landais 2015), and benefit duration (Card, Chetty,
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and Weber 2007b). Results on job quality are mixed, though tend to indicate negative
or no impacts (Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 2016; Le Barbanchon 2016; Caliendo,
Kunn, and Uhlendorff 2016; van Ours and Vodopivec 2008; Lalive 2007). Nekoei and Weber
(2017) recently argue that the impact is positive after taking into account negative duration
dependence. Some US studies have found positive impacts, although none have recently
looked the question.
This paper looks at nonemployment duration and subsequent job quality among UI bene-
fit recipients and non-recipients using four panels of U.S. survey data together covering most
of 1995 to 2013. The term ‘nonemployment’ is used broadly herein to refer to the time until
an individual finds employment following separation. Section 2 reviews related literature.
Section 3 discusses the institutional background. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
describes the empirical approach. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to two areas of research. First, is that on how UI program features
impact related durations. Second, is that on how UI program features impact subsequent
job quality.
Early empirical work found evidence of large spikes in unemployment exit rates at around
the time of and right before UI benefit exhaustion, suggesting that individuals were waiting
to return to work until their UI benefits ran out (Meyer 1990; Katz and Meyer 1988). For
individuals being recalled to a prior job, the impact was greater (Katz and Meyer 1988;
1990). More recent work indicates some of those effects were a consequence of how spells
were being measured, but that benefits still do have an impact on duration even when
measured differently (Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007b). Some of the increase in duration
likely reflects greater search intensity and fewer transitions out of the labor market, rather
than a pure moral hazard effect (Chetty 2008; Farber, Rothstein, and Valletta 2015).
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Recent empirical studies on UI program parameters and subsequent job outcomes have
mostly find negative or no impact on quality, most commonly measured by either earnings
or job tenure.1 These estimates have primarily been for European countries. Using Austrian
data, Lalive (2007) and Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007a) find that severance pay and
extended benefit duration eligibility increase nonemployment durations, but have no effect
on subsequent job match quality (RDD). On the other hand, and also using Austrian data,
Nekoei and Weber (2017) find positive match quality effects. They argue that select other
studies are consistent with their findings once negative duration dependence is taken into
account and that in fact positive impacts associated with UI benefits may offset some of the
impact from negative duration dependence. The role of negative duration dependence is an
interesting and important point.
The latest to look at job quality using U.S. data appear to be Centeno and Novo (2006),
Centeno (2004), and McCall and Chi (2008). All three use NLSY data collectively covering
1979-2002 and find that more generous UI benefits have positive impacts on subsequent job
quality.2 Consistent with those results, in Canada, Belzil (2001) finds that maximum benefit
duration has a positive impact on subsequent job duration.
Using German data, Caliendo, Tatsiramos, and Uhlendorff (2013), and Schmieder, von
Wachter, and Bender (2014; 2016) find that potential benefit durations have no or negative
job quality impacts (RDD). Using French data and focusing on “low employability workers,”
Le Barbanchon (2016) finds similar results. Using Slovenian data, van Ours and Vodopivec
(2008) find that reducing potential benefit duration had no impact on subsequent wages or
1 Others considered include region, occupation, and industry changes, firm-specific attributes,
and probabilities of full versus part-time, and of permanent versus temporary.
2 Centeno (2004) and Centeno and Novo (2006), using the NLSY male subsample covering 1979-
1998, find positive impacts of UI generosity on starting wage and job tenure (proportional hazards
model; quantile regression model). McCall and Chi (2008), use NLSY data extending to 2002, and
find that weekly benefit amounts have a significant positive impact on re-employment wages, but
that the impact dissipates with the length of the unemployment spell, reaching zero after about 34
weeks (hazards model).
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job duration, or on the probability of finding a permanent as opposed to temporary job.
Using Portuguese data, Centeno and Novo (2009) is sometimes portrayed as finding positive
quality impacts, however, they find more evidence of negative than positive impacts.3
3.3 Institutional Background
In the U.S., many features of the UI system are set at the state level. Different states
have different rules created within federal program parameters. To start a period of benefit
receipt, a worker must first establish eligibility. This is done by looking at earnings during a
base period. The standard base period used is the first four of the last five completed calendar
quarters preceding the date of application for benefits. Many states allow alternative and
modified base periods for individuals unable to establish eligibility based on the regular base
period. The idea behind these eligibility requirements is to ensure sufficient attachment to
the labor force among benefit recipients. Particular standards vary, but can be grouped into
a number of types, all requiring sufficient earnings during the base period. Another typical
requirement is that separation from employment have been involuntary, although there are
exceptions. In some states, even a worker who has not fully separated from employment can
establish benefit eligibility through short time compensation programs.
Once eligibility is established, base period earnings are again used to determine an indi-
viduals benefit amount and maximum potential benefit duration. Particulars vary here as
well.
3 They consider heterogeneity along two dimensions, essentially splitting estimates into eight
separate boxes. Two of those boxes were associated with positive impacts. Combined average
effects would likely be negative.
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3.4 Data
This study uses data from the 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) panels. The panels range from 36 to 64 months long, and start with
samples ranging from approximately 90,000 to approximately 105,000 individuals. Interviews
are conducted every four months, although most variables are recorded on a monthly basis.
Employment status is reported weekly. The data includes a rich set of information on
surveyed individuals. Other papers using SIPP data in the unemployment context include
Chetty (2008), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016), and Rothstein and Valletta (2017), Fujita
and Moscarini (2017).
3.4.1 Sample and Spell Construction
Following recommendations from the SIPP User’s Guide, I only use observations which
are assigned strictly positive longitudinal weights and do not use observations with either of
the Type Z imputations. Fujita and Moscarini (2017) use the same restriction. This restricts
the sample to individuals who participate in the entire panel and eliminates observations for
which all labor force characteristics are imputed. The same longitudinal weights are used
throughout much of the analysis.
I transform the individual-month level SIPP data into individual-spell level data based
on weekly employment status. Following common practice in the literature, individuals are
classified as either having a job (employed) or not having a job (nonemployed).4 Status defi-
nition details are provided below. Initial spells begin with each individual’s first observation
in the panel (and are all left censored). Subsequent spells begin each time an individual is
observed changing status (from employment to nonemployement, or from nonemployment to
employment). In particular, new spells begin in the week that a new status is first observed.
4 See e.g., Nekoei and Weber (2017); Barbanchon (2016); Schneider, von Watcher, and Bender
(2016); Lalive (2007); Chetty, Card, and Weber (2007a).
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The spell-based data is restricted to nonemployment spells for which data on pre and
post spell employment are available. This is necessary for comparing job attributes before
and after the spell. It also eliminates left censored nonemployment spells. Further, nonem-
ployment spells are restricted to those with at least three months of preceding employment
(Kroft and Notowidigdo 2016 and others impose this or similar restrictions). NU spells last-
ing longer than two years are dropped (following Nekoei and Weber (2017)). I also eliminate
NU spells that do not last at least two weeks. Two weeks corresponds to the waiting and
filing time period needed to apply for UI benefits (Addison and Blackburn 2000). I also drop
individuals who transition between employed and nonemployed more than once in a single
month.
Further, I drop spells for which the individual is less than 18 or greater than 70 years old
as of the first month of the spell. Similar or more restrictive age restrictions are commonly
imposed in related literature.5 I also drop spells during which an individual reports being
retired, or for which average weekly household income during the spell is less than 1 or
greater than 10,000. Additional restrictions, discussed further below, will be based on the
reported reason for job separation.
3.4.2 Variable Construction
Labor Force Status. Nonemployment duration is measured as the number of weeks that
a nonemployment spell lasts. Employed status includes: (1) people who are working, and
(2) people who are absent without pay but not on layoff. Nonemployed status includes:
unemployed and not in the labor force. Unemployed status includes: (1) people on layoff
absent without pay, and (2) people with no job who are looking or on layoff. Not in the
5 For example, Nekoei and Weber (2017) look at individuals age 30 to 50 (though use an age
cutoff regression discontinuity design), Centeno and Novo (2006) look at individuals 16 or older
(and not enrolled in school), Farber, Rothstein, and Valletta (2015) look at individuals age 18 to
69.
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labor force includes: (1) people with no job and not looking. These categories are mutually
exclusive.
Earnings. Individual earnings are reported monthly for up to two concurrent jobs. For
months in which more than one is reported, I use the sum of both. During months in which
an individual transitions from employment to nonemployment or vice versa, all earnings
are attributed to the portion of the month associated with employment. Number of weeks
employed are used for the purpose of computing weekly averages. All dollar amounts are
reported in November 2013 dollars.6 The difference in earnings before and after a nonemploy-
ment spell is used as a measure of job quality. The more earnings increase (or the less they
decrease), the more likely the job is of higher quality. All else constant, individuals should
prefer higher wages. To measure the change in earnings, I use the difference in log average
weekly earnings.7 Note, I use monthly earnings as reported rather than using a reporting
month earnings, such as in Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005), because of the panel and spell
construction structures.8
UI Program Participation. I distinguish between individuals who report receiving UI
benefits and those who do not (non-recipients). This self-reported information is subject to
measurement error and imprecision. In some cases, reported benefit receipt does not align
well with reported employment status.
Resources and Constraints. Measures of total household income are looked at using
the household in which the individual was a member during the first month of a given
nonemployment spell as the reference household. Household income is all types of income
received by all members of a household. The ratio of an individual’s earnings to the household
income, measures the individual’s level of contribution from employment. The higher the
6 Adjusted using a monthly PCE price index. FRED, PCEPI. Nominal values are used in
assessing UI eligibility and where comparison is drawn to nominal values from other sources.
7 Similar measures are used in Lalive (2007), Nekoei and Weber (2017), as well as others.
8 In particular, I use weekly earnings. Weeks per month vary, thus reference month earnings
may not translate to weekly for all months.
82
contribution, the more impact might be expected from job loss.
Individual and Household Characteristics. Unless otherwise noted, demographic and
household characteristics are as of the first month of a spell. They include: age, gender,
race, highest grade completed, school enrollment status, marital status, children under 18,
household income, and home ownership status. I construct indicators for changes in highest
level of education, marital status, children under 18, and home ownership status occurring
during spells.
State Policy Variables. State UI programs vary along multiple important dimensions.
Variables used here are the average weekly benefit and average maximum potential duration.
State benefit data on average maximum potential duration is obtained from Department of
Labor Table AR218. Observations with average maximum potential duration less than 15
weeks are dropped.9 Durations afforded under extended benefit programs are not included.10
Potential durations offer largely exogenous variation. The average maximum potential du-
ration is based upon realizations, but still offers some exogenous variation. It is used as a
control variable for job quality (wage) regressions, and to split the sample into high bene-
fit and low benefit states in looking at nonemployment duration. Average weekly benefit
duration is from the Department of Labor Monthly Program and Financial Data.
State-Level Business Cycle / Economic Conditions. Following others, I use the monthly
unemployment rate during the first month of a spell to control for business cycle conditions
(see e.g., Centeno and Novo 2006a). State-month unemployment rate data is from the BLS.
3.5 Empirical Framework
The two outcomes are nonemployment duration and job quality. Nonemployment dura-
tion is analyzed graphically using Kaplan-Meier survival curves to compare recipients and
9 Illinois 2003-2004, Maryland 1998, Maine 2011, Utah 2003, Tennessee 2009.
10 Future work could do this.
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non-recipients. It is important to note that assignment into those statuses is not random.
As a means of generating separation, I also analyze high and low benefit states separately.
State-year observations in the sample are split into high and low benefit state groups based
on the average maximum potential durations (PDs) recorded for each state-year. PDs above
median are used to define the high benefit state group. PDs at or below median are used to
define the low benefit state group. A similar approach is used in Chetty (2008). Spells are
assigned to groups based on their initial state and year. In each group, I compare recipients
and non-recipients. Non-recipients are not expected to respond to PD and should have sim-
ilar survival curves in both high and low PD states. If recipients are responding to benefit
levels, then their response is expected to be greater in high benefit states. I estimate a Cox
Proportional Hazard model to assess the significance of observed survival curve differences.11
I then estimate change in job quality using an OLS model. The approach is similar to
that in Addison and Blackburn (2001). I control for state policy related variables, which
vary over time and across states. I also include specifications that control for earnings, which
is believed to be strongly correlated with significant job attributes such as occupation.
3.6 Empirical Results
Figure 3.1 presents Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the full sample of nonemployment
spells (including those that are right censored). The survival curves show the time until
reemployment for each group. The graph shows a clear gap between recipients and non-
recipients. Figure 3.2 shows the same graph split into high and low potential duration states.
Both groups exhibit a similar notable gap between recipients and non-recipients.
11 The hazard model is specified as follows: (risk of finding a job at time t)
hi(t) = h0(t) exp(βkXik),
where the baseline hazard function, α(t) = log(h0(t)), is unspecified, Xik are covariates, and t is
the survival time (time remaining in nonemployed status).
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Figure 3.3 shows the same graphs in Figure 3.2 but plots recipients with recipients and
non-recipients with non-recipients. In panel (b) there is as expected almost no difference
between non-recipients. In panel (a) there is a slight difference but in the opposite direction
as expected. This is surprising and suggests that individuals are remaining out of work longer
in lower potential duration states. Estimating a hazard model for the sample of recipients
with an indicator for high potential duration states suggests the difference is significant at a
five percent level, although with a positive coefficient (coef = 0.04916, p = .0372).12
Results for the wage equation regressions can be found in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Table 3.3
is the same as Table 3.2 but includes spell duration as an independent variable. Results are
mixed. While the for receiving UI benefits is mostly negative, it is mostly not significant.
This suggests that there is not a significant difference in subsequent job quality, as measured
by wage difference, between recipients and non-recipients.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter does not find strong evidence of a negative relationship between receiving
unemployment insurance benefits and subsequent job quality once relevant characteristics
are controlled for. It finds suggestive evidence indicating that it may not be differences in
potential duration that are driving observed differences in nonemployment duration, at least
not entirely.
12 Using the longitudinal weights the coefficient changes to 0.059751 and becomes more significant.
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3.8 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: All Panel NU Spell Sample Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Duration (weeks) 17,462 18.61 19.27 2 104
Recieve UI 17,462 0.32 0.47 0 1
Find Job 17,462 1 0 1 1
Age 17,462 37.87 11.99 19 69
Sex
Female 17,462 0.52 0.5 0 1
Male 17,462 0.48 0.5 0 1
Race
White 17,462 0.83 0.37 0 1
Black 17,462 0.11 0.32 0 1
Asian 17,462 0.02 0.14 0 1
Other 17,462 0.04 0.18 0 1
Latino 17,462 0.07 0.26 0 1
Marital
Married 17,462 0.50 0.50 0 1
Not Married 17,462 0.30 0.46 0 1
Marg Attach 17,462 0.18 0.38 0 1
Top Educ
Less HS 17,462 0.14 0.35 0 1
HS 17,462 0.30 0.46 0 1
Some Coll 17,462 0.36 0.48 0 1
Bach Plus 17,462 0.20 0.40 0 1
Enroll 17,462 0.10 0.30 0 1
Living
Own 17,462 0.61 0.49 0 1
Rent 17,462 0.36 0.48 0 1
Occupy 17,462 0.03 0.17 0 1
Avg HH Inc (week) 17,462 1,363 1,341 1.03 9,951




Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Prior Emp
Duration (weeks) 17,462 54 47 6 267
Avg Earn (week) 17,462 550 563 0 9,921
Avg Hours 17,462 36.9 17.9 0 168
Ever PT 17,462 0.645 0.479 0 1
Ever Multi-Job 17,462 0.324 0.468 0 1
Future Emp
Duration (weeks) 17,461 52 52.1 1 265
Avg Earn (week) 17,461 543 591 0 14,291
Avg Hours 17,461 36.8 18.9 0 170
Ever PT 17,461 0.6 0.5 0 1
Ever Multi-Job 17,461 0.324 0.468 0 1
Changes
△ Wage 17,461 -1.6 72.7 -266 254
△ Log Wage 17,461 -0.3 1.5 -5.6 3.5
△ Educ 17,462 0.013 0.114 0 1
△ Kid 17,462 0.024 0.152 0 1
△ Marital 17,462 0.015 0.121 0 1
△ Living 17,462 0.038 0.191 0 1
Source: SIPP 1996-2008 panels and author calculation. See text for
detail.
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Figure 3.1: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves, Recipient vs Non-Recipient
Full sample of nonemployment spells.
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Figure 3.2: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves, High vs Low Potential Duration States
(a) Low Potential Duration States
(b) High Potential Duration States
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Figure 3.3: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves, High/Low, Recipient/Non-Recipient
(a) UI Recipients in High and Low Potential Duration States
(b) Non-Recipients in High and Low Potential Duration States
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Table 3.2: Wage Difference Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Receive UI −0.0436 0.0006 −0.0044
(0.0281) (0.0308) (0.0310)
Log Prior Earn 0.0150 0.0164
(0.0168) (0.0167)
Log Avg Week Ben −0.4691∗∗∗ −0.9630∗∗∗
(0.0579) (0.0892)










Less HS −0.0614 −0.0397
(0.0473) (0.0479)























Constant −0.2978∗∗∗ 2.2479∗∗∗ 4.3840∗∗∗
(0.0164) (0.3646) (0.5199)
State FE ✓
Observations 16,920 16,912 16,912
R2 0.0002 0.0144 0.0243
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0133 0.0204
Residual Std. Error 12.8840 12.8012 12.7551
F Statistic 3.1100∗ 12.9998∗∗∗ 6.1771∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Source: SIPP 1994-2008 panels. See text for detail.
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Table 3.3: Wage Difference Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Receive UI −0.0565∗∗ −0.0072 −0.0117
(0.0284) (0.0312) (0.0314)
Duration (Weeks) 0.0017∗∗ 0.0010 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Log Prior Earn 0.0149 0.0164
(0.0168) (0.0167)
Log Avg Week Ben −0.4687∗∗∗ −0.9645∗∗∗
(0.0579) (0.0892)








High School −0.0234 −0.0038
(0.0395) (0.0396)
Less High School −0.0651 −0.0429
(0.0474) (0.0480)





















U Rate 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0669∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0084)




Observations 16,920 16,912 16,912
R2 0.0007 0.0146 0.0244
Adjusted R2 0.0006 0.0134 0.0204
Residual Std. Error 12.8812 12.8006 12.7547
F Statistic 5.7387∗∗∗ 12.4730∗∗∗ 6.1157∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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